19 Chapter 25: Action Options and Response Objectives

Chapter Objectives

1. Explain predetermined procedures. [5.3.1]
2. Explain the role of first responders in initiating protective actions. [4.4.1, 5.2.1, 5.3.1, 5.4.1]
3. Describe the process of size-up and risk assessment. [4.2.1, 5.2.1, 5.3.1, 5.4.1]
4. Differentiate among hazardous materials incident levels. [5.2.1]
5. Explain the three modes of operation at hazardous materials incidents. [5.3.1]
6. Explain the process of planning the initial response at hazardous materials incidents. [5.3.1]
7. Explain ways of implementing response objectives and action options. [5.4.1, 6.2.1]
8. Differentiate among types of terrorist attacks and their associated hazards. [5.2.1]
9. Identify hazards at illicit laboratories. [5.2.1]
10. Recognize illegal hazmat dumps. [5.2.1]
11. Describe hazardous materials response during and after natural disasters. [5.2.1]
12. Identify processes for evaluating progress at a hazardous materials incident. [5.6.1]
13. Skill Sheet 25-1: Make appropriate notifications of a hazardous materials incident. [4.4.1]
14. Skill Sheet 25-2: Implement protective actions at a hazardous materials incident. [4.3.1]
15. Skill Sheet 25-3: Provide scene control at a hazardous materials incident. [5.4.1]
16. Skill Sheet 25-4: Identify actions available at a hazardous materials incident. [5.3.1]
17. Skill Sheet 25-5: Evaluate progress made at a hazardous materials incident. [5.6.1]

The first step in mitigating or solving any hazmat incident is understanding the problem within the framework of incident priorities, IMS, and predetermined procedures. First responders can form an overall plan of action by understanding the problem and its entire component parts. After an overall plan is formed, first responders should use NIMS-ICS to develop an Incident Action Plan (IAP), assign tasks, and implement planned strategies. Some incidents such as terrorism present unique challenges for first responders with regard to planning and implementation. This chapter provides a broad overview of incident management at a scene and also provides details on terrorist activities and other criminal behaviour that is important for planning and implementing response at those types of incidents.

Now, what?

Let’s get learning! 

Lesson 1

Outcomes: 

1. Explain predetermined procedures.

Predetermined Procedures

During a hazmat incident, developing an appropriate Incident Action Plan (IAP) is vital because mistakes made in the initial response can make the difference between solving the problem and becoming part of it (Figure 25.1). While the Incident Commander (IC) may be responsible for developing the Incident Action Plan and identifying the response objectives and options, all responders must understand the process and know the tasks they may be asked to perform.

Despite obvious variations, hazmat incidents typically share some similarities. These similarities are the basis for an organization’s predetermined standard operating procedures (SOPs). They may also include emergency response plans.

SOPs should include considerations for the following:

• Chemical responses
• Biological responses
• Radiological/nuclear responses
• WMD responses
• Explosives/explosive materials responses
• Significant incident responses

Standard guidelines have a built-in flexibility that allows adjustments, with reasonable justification, when unforeseen circumstances occur. The first units that reach the scene usually initiate the predetermined actions. The initial response actions supplement, but do not replace, incident size-up and other decisions based on professional judgment, evaluation, or command. In addition, several predetermined procedures may be available from which to choose, depending on incident severity, location, and the ability of first-in units to achieve control.

Following predetermined procedures reduces chaos on the hazmat scene. All resources can be used in a co-ordinated effort to rescue victims, stabilize the incident, and protect the environment and property. Operational procedures that are standardized, clearly written, and mandated to each department/organization member, establish accountability and increase command and control effectiveness.

Predetermined procedures also help prevent duplication of effort and uncoordinated operations because all positions are assigned and covered. In addition, predetermined procedures describe assumption and transfer of command, communications procedures, and tactical procedures.

SOPs should define your role according to your training level at emergency incidents, including those involving hazardous materials. While the procedures may vary considerably in different localities, the principles are usually the same. You must know the location of your agency’s emergency response plan and written SOPs (Figure 25.2). Finally, all predetermined procedures must keep incident priorities (life safety, incident stabilization, protection of property) in mind and be designed to enhance those priorities. Never risk your life to save property that is replaceable or cannot be saved.

All plans must be made with these priorities in mind. However, incidents are dynamic and priorities may change according to the situation.

** NOTE: A fourth priority, societal restoration, is sometimes added to this list to ensure that the recovery phase of major incidents is considered from the beginning. **

Lesson 2

Outcomes: 

1. Explain the role of first responders in initiating protective actions.

Initiating Protective Actions

Protective actions, including notifications, isolation, and scene control, can ensure your own safety and the safety of others. These actions are often taken by the first responders to arrive at a scene, even before an IC has been established or incident management has been implemented. These techniques protect people by separating them from the potential source of harm and preventing the spread of hazardous materials through cross contamination. When the IC arrives, he or she will conduct a size-up and may revise the protective actions initiated based upon his or her observations.

Notification and Requests for Assistance

Predetermined procedures, such as standard operating procedures (SOPs) and the emergency response plan, should define roles in the notification process and methods for communication. For Awareness Level personnel, notification may be as simple as dialling 9-1-1 to report an incident and request emergency assistance (Figure 25.3). Fixed-facility responders may have their own internal procedures to follow such as calling on the radio for an internal fire brigade or hazmat response team. If criminal or terrorist activity is suspected, personnel should notify law enforcement immediately. Skills associated with making appropriate notifications of a hazardous materials incident are shown in Skill Sheet 25-1.

Departmental SOPs usually cover communication methods (both externally and internally) at incidents, whether by radio, cell phone, hand signals, or other methods. Personnel and responders must be able to communicate the need for assistance through their department/organization’s communications equipment. Some of these communications might be requests for additional personnel or special equipment, or to notify others at the incident of any apparent hazards. Personnel and responders must be trained to use the communication equipment assigned to them in accordance with policies and procedures.

Emergency response plans must ensure that responders understand their role in notification processes and predetermined procedures such as standard operating procedures (SOPs). Notification may include actions such as incident-level identification and public emergency information/notification. It is better to dispatch more re-sources than necessary in an initial response to ensure appropriate weight of attack to combat incident conditions. Responders should be familiar with the assets available in their jurisdictions.

Because hazmat incidents have the potential to overwhelm local resources, responders must know the procedure to request additional assets. This process should be described in local, district, regional, state, and national emergency response plans as well as in mutual/automatic aid agreements.

Notification also involves contacting law enforcement whenever a terrorist or criminal incident is suspected, as well as notifying other agencies (such as public works and the local emergency operations centre) that an incident has occurred. Procedures will differ depending on the AHJ. Always follow SOPs and emergency plans for notification procedures.

In the U.S., the notification process is detailed in the National Response Framework (NRF), and all local, state, and federal emergency response plans must comply with these provisions. While incidents are handled at the lowest geographic, organizational, and jurisdictional level, when local agencies need additional assistance beyond the local level, the hazmat IC or AHJ may request help.

First responders in the U.S. should turn to the local emergency response plan (LERP) if they need to request outside assistance for an incident (Figure 25.4). Per the NRF, the local response agency should be closely tied with the community’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC). If local assets are insufficient to manage the emergency, requests for additional assistance (such as activation of National Guard units) will be made to the state EOC. States may then request federal assistance through the Department of Homeland Security. The proper authorities (local, state, and federal) must be informed that an incident has occurred, even if additional assistance is not required for an incident.

The following are resources that may be requested to help at hazmat/WMD incidents in the U.S. or Canada:

• Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST)
  • These teams support civil authorities at domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive incident sites by identifying CBRNE agents/substances.

• 

  Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT)

  • These are groups of professional and paraprofessional medical personnel (supported by a cadre of logistical and administrative staff) that provide emergency medical care during a disaster or other event (Figure 25.5).
• Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams (DMORT)
  • These teams work under the guidance of local authorities and provide technical assistance and personnel to recover, identify, and process deceased victims.
• National Medical Response Team-Weapons of Mass Destruction (NMRT-WMD)
  • These are specialized response forces that provide medical care following a nuclear, biological, and/or chemical incident.
• National Guard Chemical, Biological,Radiological, Nuclear and High Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP)
  • The CERFPs and Civil Support Teams (CSTs) provide a phased capability.
  • The CSTs detect and identify CBRNE agents/substances, assess their effects, advise the local authorities on managing response to attacks, and assist with requests for other forces.
  • The CERFPs locate and extract victims from a contaminated environment, perform mass patient/casualty decontamination, and provide treatment as necessary to stabilize patients for evacuation.
• Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Task Forces
  • These highly trained teams provide search-and-rescue operations in damaged or collapsed structures and stabilization of damaged structures. They can also provide emergency medical care to the injured.
• Incident Management Teams (IMT)
  • These teams of highly trained, experienced individuals are organized to manage large and/or complex incidents. They provide full logistical support for receiving and distribution centres.

Isolation and Scene Control

Isolation involves physically securing and maintaining the emergency scene (scene control) by establishing isolation perimeters or cordons and denying entry to unauthorized persons (Figure 25.6). It also includes preventing contaminated or potentially contaminated individuals (or animals) from leaving the scene in order to stop the spread of hazardous materials. The isolation perimeter (outer perimeter or outer cordon) is the boundary established to prevent unauthorized access to and egress from the scene. If an incident is inside a building, personnel posted at entrances can deny entry and exit from the building in order to set the isolation perimeter. If the incident is outdoors, the perimeter might be set at the surrounding intersections with response vehicles or law enforcement officers diverting vehicular traffic and pedestrians (Figure 25.7). Ropes, cones, and barrier tape can also be used. In some cases, a traffic cordon may be established beyond the outer cordon to prevent unauthorized vehicle access while still allowing for pedestrian traffic. The isolation process may continue with evacuation, defending in place, or sheltering in place of people located within protective-action zones.

The isolation perimeter can be expanded or reduced as needed. For example, when additional resources arrive, the initial isolation perimeter may be expanded to accommodate new apparatus, equipment, and personnel. Law enforcement officers are often tasked to establish and maintain isolation perimeters. The isolation perimeter may be comprised of an inner and outer perimeter. In most cases, the outcomes of an on-site risk assessment determine the initial isolation perimeter established. Once the scene is secure and an isolation perimeter has been established and controlled, Awareness Level responders are likely not trained to the necessary levels to continue the mitigation of the incident. There is one exception to this general rule. Awareness Level responders may be trained to mitigate incidental releases without calling for additional assistance.

Skills associated with implementing protective actions at a hazardous materials incident are shown in Skill Sheet 25-2.

Once resources have been committed to an incident, it is easier to reduce the isolation perimeter in size than it is to extend it. If resources have arrived and have been tasked at an incident, it may be difficult to disengage and relocate them should the initial perimeter be inadequate. The IC must undertake a risk assessment or size-up of the incident in order to determine an appropriate size for the isolation perimeter. To determine the perimeter size, the IC should consult with other onsite agency commanders to ensure that the spatial requirements and tactical objectives can be met.

** NOTE: From a risk-management perspective, it is better to encompass a larger area that can be reduced in size once incident-site conditions have been assessed for risks such as secondary devices, unidentified hazardous materials, and atmospheric monitoring. **

The isolation perimeter is also used to control both access and egress from the incident site. Unauthorized personnel may be kept out, while witnesses and persons with information about the incident may be directed to a safe location until being interviewed and released.

Another important aspect of scene control at hazmat/WMD incidents is the establishment of hazard-control zones and staging areas, explained inthe following sections. Skill Sheet 25-3 provides basic steps for providing scene control and performing various assigned tasks at a hazardous materials incident.

Emergency Response Centres

Emergency response centres can provide useful information and guidance to first responders. The ERG provides contact information for emergency response centres in the U.S., Canada, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia. Contact numbers are provided in the white pages in both the front and the back of the ERG.

In the U.S., several emergency response centres, such as the Chemical Transportation Emergency Center (CHEMTREC®), are not government-operated. CHEMTREC® was established by the chemical industry as a public service hotline for firefighters, law enforcement responders, and other emergency service responders to obtain information and assistance for emergency incidents involving chemicals and hazardous materials (Figure 25.8). The experts staffing these centres can provide 24-hour assistance to personnel responding to hazmat incidents

 

Transport Canada operates the Canadian Transport Emergency Centre (CANUTEC).

This national, bilingual (English and French) advisory centre is part of the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Directorate. CANUTEC has a scientific data bank of chemicals manufactured, stored, and transported in Canada and is staffed by professional scientists who specialize in emergency response.

Mexico has two emergency response centres:

1. National Center for Communications of the Civil Protection Agency (CENACOM)
2. Emergency Transportation System for the Chemical Industry (SETIQ), operated by the National Association of Chemical Industries.

** NOTE: CENACOM has phone numbers dedicated to calls originating in Mexico City and its metropolitan area. Do not call these numbers if you are not in that area. **

Before you contact the emergency response centre, collect as much of the following information as safely possible:

• Caller’s name, callback telephone number, and fax number
• Location and nature of problem (such as spill or fire)
• Name and identification number of material(s) involved
• Shipper/consignee/point of origin
• Carrier name, railcar reporting marks (letters and numbers), or truck number
• Container type and size
• Quantity of material transported/released
• Local conditions (such as weather, terrain, proximity to schools, hospitals, or waterways)
• Injuries, exposures, current conditions involving spills, leaks, fires, explosions, and vapour clouds
• Local emergency services that have been notified The emergency response centre will:
• Confirm that a chemical emergency exists.
• Record details electronically and in written form.
• Provide immediate technical assistance to the caller.
• Contact the shipper of the material or other experts.
• Provide the shipper/manufacturer with the caller’s name and callback number so that the shipper/manufacturer can deal directly with the party involved.

Test Your Knowledge!

Lesson 3

Outcomes: 

1. Describe the process of size-up and risk assessment.

Size-Up and Hazard and Risk Assessment

Upon arrival at the incident, the IC assesses the incident’s conditions to recognize clues indicating problems or potential problems. This process is called size-up, the mental process of the Incident Commander considering all available factors that will affect an incident during the operations’ course. The information gained from the size-up is used to determine the response objectives (strategies) and action options (tactics) that are applied to the incident during the planning and implementation stages.

Hazard and Risk Assessment

Hazard and risk assessment is part of the size-up process, focusing particularly on the dangers, hazards, and risks present at the incident. Hazard and risk assessment is a continual evaluation. It starts with pre-incident planning and continues throughout the incident response operation. The first IC who arrives on the scene conducts an extensive size-up and then continues assessing hazards throughout the incident, altering the mitigation process to minimize risk and maximize benefit, as appropriate.

During hazmat size-up, the IC must consider all sides of the incident (Figure 25.9). Hazmat size-up is frequently complicated by limited information or an inability to access the scene due to hazards present. The IC’s view of the incident may be limited by the size of the hazard area or location of the release (such as inside a vehicle or structure). In addition, limited or conflicting information regarding the product or products involved is possible. Initial assessment is based on anticipated conditions and updated as additional information becomes available.

Once on the scene, additional pieces of the hazard and risk assessment are added to the information made available before arrival.

The following factors may have an effect on the situation, such as:

• Wind direction
• Land use
• Topography
• Presence of victims
• Equipment access
• Available response personnel

After the material has been identified, responders can use references such as safety data sheets (SDSs), shipping papers with emergency response information, other written or computer references, and the generic information provided by the ERG to determine the health and physical hazards presented by the material. This will assist in determining the level of risk presented by the hazardous material itself. Manufacturers, shippers, and carriers may provide additional response information such as hazards, behaviour, and other recommendations when contacted. Emergency contact information may be provided on shipping papers, pipeline markings, or other container markings. Emergency response centres such as CHEMTREC, CANUTEC, and SETIQ will also contact manufacturers, shippers, and carriers. First responders should be able to predict (or attempt to predict) where the hazardous material may be going by using the ERG and other sources (such as plume-modelling software, if available).

Responders can also predict where the hazardous material is going given its physical state of matter (liquid, gas, or solid) and the environ-mental conditions present (night or day, wind or no wind, indoors or outdoors) (Figure 25.10). Responders can determine the concentration and spread of the material by using monitoring and detection devices. Given this information, responders can estimate the size of the endangered area and predict potential exposures, including (Figure 25.11):

• Number of people
• Buildings
• Property
• Environmental concerns in the area such as sewer drains, streams, lakes, ponds, and wells

Surrounding Conditions

In addition to identifying hazmat containers and their contents, first responders need to survey surrounding conditions. While conducting this survey, first responders should identify relevant information, including (Figure 25.12):

• Potential site hazards, such as overhead power lines, highway traffic, and rail lines
• Potential ignition sources
• Potential victims and exposures
• Weather and time of day
• Topography
• Information about the building and building components, if indoors Site Hazards Hazmat incidents can occur anywhere and, often, the location itself will present its own hazards (Figure 25.13).

For example, if the incident occurs on a road or highway, responders will need to take protective actions against traffic and other highway hazards such as falls from overpasses, bridges, and other heights. If the incident occurs on or near rail lines, responders should protect themselves, victims, and property from passing trains and other rail hazards. Overhead power lines may have been knocked down during the incident or present a hazard to elevating equipment such as aerial apparatus or cranes. Other site-specific hazards could present potential contamination, environmental, or thermal hazards specific to the hazardous materials involved in the incident.

Potential Ignition Sources

If the incident involves a flammable or combustible material — and the majority of hazmat incidents do — responders must avoid igniting these materials. Even if the material involved at the incident has not been identified, remove as many ignition sources as possible. Flammable gases and vapours can travel to unexpected places and tend to settle in low-lying areas.

Many potential ignition sources may exist at the scene of a hazardous materials incident including (Figure 25.14):

• Open flames
• Static electricity
• Pilot lights
• Electrical sources including non-explosion-proof electrical equipment
• Internal combustion engines in vehicles and generators
• Heated surfaces
• Cutting and welding operations
• Radiant heat
• Heat caused by friction or chemical reactions
• Cigarettes and other smoking materials
• Cameras/cellular phones
• Road flares

The following actions can ignite flammable/explosive atmospheres (Figure 25.15):

• Opening or closing a switch or electrical circuit such as a light-switch
• Turning on a flashlight
• Operating a radio
• Activating a cell phone

Potential Victims and Exposures

Responders must quickly identify potential victims and exposures. Potential exposures include people, property, and the environment. The potential exposures will determine the need for rescue and protective actions. The nature and extent of injuries may give clues to the product(s) involved and the hazards present as well as determine the need for decontamination and medical care.

Weather

If an incident is outdoors, the weather can dramatically affect how an incident progresses and is mitigated. For instance, if temperatures are below freezing, it may be impractical or impossible to use water for decontamination or dilution processes. Hot temperatures may cause liquids to evaporate more rapidly, producing more vapours or potentially raising a flammable material’s temperature to its ignition point. Wind direction may determine where and how far gases, vapours, or solid particulates travel. Rain or high humidity may cause water-reactive materials to burn or explode. The time of day can also influence chemical behaviour due to the conditions typically present. At night, winds tend to be lighter, so gases and vapours will not typically travel as far. Nights also tend to be cooler, so liquids tend not to evaporate as rapidly. In addition, temperature gradients may be significantly different in an area due to topography and bodies of water.

Topography

Topography makes a significant difference in the considerations needed to determine the appropriate isolation distance. The ERG (green-bordered pages) defines isolation distances. Topography is a factor in rural environments, such as flat plains or passes through mountains, as well as in developed environments such as wind tunnels between tall buildings and chemical processing areas. Topography may play an important role in where liquid and gaseous hazardous materials travel. If an outdoor incident involves a liquid, topography and gravity determine where the liquid might go, such as into culverts and ditches.

These drainage areas may lead to the following environmentally sensitive areas that require protection:

• Streams and rivers
• Ponds, lakes, or wetlands
• Storm and sewer drains

Topography may also affect the travel of gases and vapours, with heavier-than-air vapours and gases following the contours of the land. When determining potential movement of hazardous vapours and gases, consider:

• Local thermal winds
• Upslope winds
• Downslope winds
• Breezes
• Aspect (for instance, if the incident aspect is facing the sun, a rise in temperature may affect the material and/ or the container)
• Mountain or valley elevation, which can become an issue in relation to vapour density

Building Information

For incidents occurring indoors, the following information may be relevant:

• Location of floor drains
• Air handling ducts, returns, and units
• Location and components of fire protection and detection equipment
• Gas, electric, and water shut-off locations
• Presence of potential backup generators

Situational Awareness: Hazmat Incidents

Effective mitigation of any hazardous material incident requires that emergency responders establish and maintain situational awareness of the event. Situational awareness is more than just size-up of the incident. Situational awareness is a continuous process that includes: (Figure 25.16)

• Size-up
• Interpreting signs
• Assessing what is happening over the life of the incident
• Predicting outcomes based on a plan of action

Maintaining situational awareness is one of the greatest challenges to emergency responders as the process is also met with barriers such as competing priorities, distractions, and information overload. Failure to establish and maintain situational awareness of the incident is likely to result in a failure to achieve the desired outcome.

Situational awareness is sometimes referred to as a process working at three levels:

• Level 1 Perception: Perceive the situation around us.
• Level 2 Comprehension: Apply our knowledge and past experiences to our perception and develop an understanding of the meaning of the situation.
• Level 3Application: Take our understanding of the situation and apply it to the future, thereby predicting how and when the situation will change and what action is appropriate on our part.

The loss of situational awareness creates an opportunity for errors to occur and improper decisions to be made.

The following eight factors may lead to the loss of situational awareness:

1. Ambiguity:  Information received is confusing or unclear.
2. Distraction: Loss of focus of the original mission without appropriate rationale.
3. Fixation: Too focused on a single element of the situation to the exclusion of all others. This indicator includes personal concerns such as financial or family problems.
4. Overload: Tasks or information overwhelm us, or we attempt to perform all the tasks ourselves.
5. Complacency: False sense of comfort based on a misconception of the hazard, risk, or situation sometimes based on past, seemingly similar experience.
6. Improper procedure: Policies or procedures are violated or ignored without justification.
7. Unresolved discrepancy: Two or more pieces of information do not agree.
8. Lack of comprehensive hazard surveillance: Crew members become so fixated on one detail that they ignore everything else.

Proper situational awareness depends on performing the following actions:

• Maintain effective communications.
• Recognize and make others aware of any deviation from standard operating procedures (SOPs) or policies.
• Monitor crew member performance.
• Provide information in advance of an operation or mission.
• Identify any potential problems or existing hazards.
• Communicate the desired course of action.
• Communicate the mission’s status continuously.
• Evaluate the situation for any changes continually.
• Clarify expectations of crew members continually.

Lesson 4

Outcomes: 

1. Differentiate among hazardous materials incident levels.
2. Explain the three modes of operation at hazardous materials incidents.

Incident Levels

After the initial size-up has determined the scope of an incident, the level of the incident can be determined in accordance with the definitions in the Local Emergency Response Plan (LERP). Most incident level models define three levels of response graduating from Level I (least serious) to Level III (most serious). By defining the levels of response, an increasing level of involvement and necessary resources can be identified based on the severity of the incident.

These levels are described as follows:

• 

  Level I: Within the capabilities of the fire or emergency services organization or other first responders having jurisdiction.

  • A Level I incident is the least serious and the easiest to handle.
  • It may pose a serious threat to life or property, although this situation is not usually the case. Evacuation (if required) is limited to the immediate area of the incident.
  • The following are examples of Level I incidents:
    • Small amount of gasoline or diesel fuel spilled from an automobile (Figure 25.17)
    • Leak from domestic natural gas line on the consumer side of the meter
    • Broken containers of consumer commodities such as paint, thinners, bleach, swimming pool chemicals, and fertilizers (owner or proprietor is responsible for cleanup and disposal) 
•  Level II: Beyond the capabilities of the first responders on the scene and may be beyond the capabilities of the first response agency/organization having jurisdiction.
  • Level II incidents may require the services of a formal hazmat response team.
  • A properly trained and equipped response team could be expected to perform the following tasks:
    • Use chemical protective clothing (Figure 25.18).
      

      

    • Dike and confine within the contaminated areas.
    • Perform plugging, patching, and basic leak control activities.
    • Sample and test unknown substances (Figure 25.19).
    • Perform various levels of decontamination.
  • The following are examples of Level II incidents:
    • Spill or leak requiring limited-scale evacuation
    • Any major accident, spillage, or overflow of flammable liquids
    • Spill or leak of unfamiliar or unknown chemicals
    • Accident involving extremely hazardous substances
    • Rupture of an underground pipeline
    • Fire that is posing a boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion (BLEVE) threat in a storage tank
• Level III: Requires resources from state/provincial agencies, federal agencies, and/or private industry and also requires Unified Command.
  

  

  • A Level III incident is the most serious of all hazardous material incidents.
  • A large-scale evacuation may be required.
  • Most likely, the incident will not be concluded by any one agency (Figure 25.20).
  • Successful handling of the incident requires a collective effort from several of the following resources/procedures:
    • Specialists from industry and governmental agencies
    • Sophisticated sampling and monitoring equipment
    • Specialized leak and spill control techniques
    • Decontamination on a large scale
  • The following are examples of Level III incidents:
    • An evacuation extending across jurisdictional boundaries
    • Beyond the capabilities of the local hazardous material response team
    • Activate (in part or in whole) the federal response plan

Operational Strategies

Hazmat Incidents Strategies are divided into three options that relate to modes of operation:

• Nonintervention: Allows the incident to run its course on its own.
• Defensive: Provides confinement of the hazard to a given area by performing diking, damming, or diverting actions.
• Offensive: Includes actions, such as plugging a leak, to control the incident (Figure 25.21).

Selection of the strategic mode is based on the risk to responders, their level of training, and the balance between the resources required and those that are available. When selecting a mode of operation, the safety of first responders is the utmost consideration. The mode of operation may change during the course of an incident. Incident priorities will help determine which mode is used at the incident. The IC may decide to use different modes simultaneously at the same incident based on incident dynamics.

Nonintervention

Nonintervention operations are operations in which the responders do not take direct actions on the actual problem. Not taking any action is the only safe strategy in many types of incidents and the best strategy in certain types of incidents when mitigation is failing or otherwise impossible. An example of a situation for nonintervention is a pressure vessel that cannot be adequately cooled because it is exposed to fire. In such incidents, responders should evacuate personnel in the area and with-draw to a safe distance.

 

The nonintervention mode is selected when one or more of the following circumstances exist:

• The facility or Local Emergency Response Plan (LERP) calls for it based on a pre-incident evaluation of the hazards present at the site.
• The situation is clearly beyond the capabilities of responders (Figure 25.22).
• Explosions are imminent.
• Serious container damage threatens a massive release.

In such nonintervention situations, first responders should take the following actions:

• Withdraw to a safe distance
• Report scene conditions to the telecommunications centre
• Initiate an incident management system
• Call for additional resources as needed
• Isolate the hazard area and deny entry
• Begin evacuation where needed

Defensive

Defensive operations are those in which responders seek to confine the emergency to a given area without directly contacting the hazardous materials involved.

The defensive mode is selected when one of the following two circumstances exists:

1. The facility or LERP calls for it based on a pre-incident evaluation of the hazards present at the site.
2. Responders have the training and equipment necessary to confine the incident to the area of origin.

In defensive operations, Operations Level first responders should take the following actions:

• Report scene conditions to the telecommunications centre.
• Initiate an incident management system.
• Call for additional resources as needed.
• Isolate the hazard area and deny entry.
• Establish and indicate zone boundaries.
• Begin evacuation where needed.
• Control ignition sources.
• Use appropriate defensive control tactics (Figure 25.23).
• Protect exposures.
• Perform rescues when safe and appropriate.
• Evaluate and report incident progress.
• Perform emergency decontamination procedures.
  

  

Offensive

Offensive operations are those where responders take aggressive, direct action on the material, container, or process equipment involved in the incident (Figure 25.24). These operations may result in contact with the material and therefore require responders to wear appropriate chemical-protective clothing and respiratory protection. Some offensive operations are beyond the scope of responsibilities for first responders and are conducted by more highly trained hazardous materials personnel.

Lesson 5

Outcomes:

1. Explain the process of planning the initial response at hazardous materials incidents.
2. Explain ways of implementing response objectives and action options.

Planning the Initial Response

Once the incident analysis is underway and there is a basic understanding of the hazards and products involved, the IC must use that information to plan the response. Thinking the situation through and developing a solid strategy with realistic response objectives will deliver a successful and safe outcome.

Using a response model can simplify the problem-solving process because most response models incorporate an entire problem-solving process:

• An information gathering or input stage
• A processing or planning stage
• An implementation or output stage
• A review or evaluation stage

There are many models from which to choose. Most models move through each of the basic stages in problem solving and decision making, and the model used will often be dictated by departmental policy.

APIE Response Model

APIE is a simple response model containing the basic four-step problem-solving process model elements:

1. Analyze the incident.
2. Plan the initial response.
3. Implement the response.
4. Evaluate progress.

Risk-Based Response

A risk-based response uses information, science, and technology to mitigate a hazardous materials incident. The key is to equip responders with the critical information that is needed to make good decisions, while not over-whelming them with nice-to-know information.

Product identification is a vital element in successful mitigation of a hazmat incident. While this is true, the reality of the situation is that it may not always be possible. In either case, implement a risk-based response for all hazardous materials incidents. Risk-based response is a hierarchy of decisions needed to protect responders. As with most successful incidents, the response starts with a thorough size-up, identifying the immediate hazards so that decisions can be made in a logical and educated manner. Too much time can be wasted attempting to research a property that may not exist, may not be present, or cannot be found. While a strong size-up helps with prediction, it is detection and monitoring equipment that will help protect the responders. A risk-based response is a quick and efficient way to “thin slice” information and make educated, lifesaving decisions.

Developing the Incident Action Plan (IAP)

Incident Action Plans (IAPs) are critical to the rapid, effective control of emergency operations. An IAP is a well-thought-out, organized course of events developed to address all phases of incident control within a specified time. The timeframe specified is one that allows the least negative action to continue. Written IAPs may not be necessary for short-term, routine operations; however, large-scale or complex incidents require the creation and maintenance of a written plan for each operational period (Figure 25.25). Action planning starts with identifying the response objective (strategy) to achieve a solution to the confronted problems. A response objective is broad in nature and defines what has to be done. Once the strategy has been defined, the Command Staff needs to select the action options (tactics, the how, where, and when) to achieve the objective.

Action options are measurable in both time and performance. An IAP also provides for necessary support resources such as water supply, utility control, or SCBA cylinder filling. TheIAP ties the entire problem-solving process together by stating what the analysis has found, what the plan is, and how it shall be safely implemented. Once the plan is established and resources are committed, it is necessary to assess its effectiveness. Gather and analyze information so that necessary modifications may be made to improve the plan if necessary. This step is part of a continuous size-up process.

Elements of an IAP

Elements of an IAP include the following:

• Strategies/incident objectives
• Resource assignment and needs
• Hazard statement
• Safety plan and message
• Current situation summary
• Accomplishments
• Risk assessment
• Protective measures
• Current and projected weather conditions
• Status of injuries
• Communications plan
• Medical plan

All incident personnel must function according to the IAP. Company officers or sector officers should follow predetermined procedures, and every action should be directed toward achieving the goals and objectives specified in the plan. For practical purposes, all first responders should be familiar with the concept of IAPs and site safety plans because they have a direct effect on actions taken at an emergency incident scene. A first responder assuming the role of IC will need to develop and implement an IAP.

Common Response Objectives and Action Options at Hazmat Incidents

Once first responders have a basic understanding of the problem, they can begin to plan their solution by establishing response objectives (strategies) and action options (tactics). Response objectives are broad statements of what must be done to resolve an incident. Action options are specific operations that must be done in order to accomplish those goals. Skill Sheet 25-4 provides steps for identifying action options at a hazardous materials incident.

Response objectives must be selected based on the following criteria:

1. Their ability to be achieved
2. Their ability to prevent further injuries and/or deaths
3. Their ability to minimize environmental and property damage within the constraints of safety, time, equipment, and personnel

Risk-based response objectives are based upon the hazards present at the incident. For example, if materials with higher levels of toxicity are involved, a more cautious response using higher levels of personal protective equipment might be used. An incident involving a hazardous material in a gaseous or vapour form might dictate a different strategy for control than an incident involving a hazardous material in a solid or liquid form that is far easier (and safer) to contain.

Some additional risk-based response principles are as follows:

• Activities that present a significant risk to the safety of members shall be limited to situations where there is a potential to save endangered lives.
• Activities that are routinely employed to protect property shall be recognized as inherent risks to the safety of members, and actions shall be taken to reduce or avoid these risks.
• No risk to the safety of members shall be acceptable when there is no possibility to save lives or property.

Making the right strategic decision at a hazmat incident is critical because of the variety of developments that can occur. Poorly developed decision-making processes can lead to greater problems. References such as the Emergency Response Guidebook’s orange-bordered pages, relevant Safety Data Sheet sections, shipping papers with emergency response information, and other resources may provide some response information and guidance.

 

Some common response objectives at hazardous materials incidents are:

• Isolation
• Notification
• Identification
• Protection (life safety)
• Rescue (Figure 25.26)
• Spill control/confinement
• Leak control/containment
• Crime scene and evidence preservation
• Fire control
• Recovery/termination

While these are some of the common response objectives, ICs can set whatever objectives they deem appropriate, using whatever terms they prefer. Rescue might be considered an important response objective at one incident but not at another. If conditions at an incident change suddenly, rapid evacuation might become a response objective that springs to the top of the priority list.

Response objectives are prioritized depending on available resources and the particular details of the incident. Some response objectives may not be needed if the hazard is not present at the incident. If the material involved is non-flammable, fire control may not be an issue. Some goals may require the use of specialized resources (such as chemical protective clothing or specific absorbent materials) that are not yet available and therefore must be postponed or eliminated. Others may require the use of so large a percent of the available resources that the ability to complete other objectives might be compromised. The response objectives listed in this chapter are very broad strategic categories, and mitigation at an actual incident may require a variety of response objectives based on the problems presented at the scene.

Action options are the specific tactics that are used to accomplish response objectives. These are the tasks the responder will be asked to perform in order to mitigate the incident. For example, if “isolation” is the action objective, evacuating people from the hazard area might be an appropriate response option. Table 25.1 Typical Hazmat Problems with Potential Response Objectives and Action Options, provides common problems presented at hazmat incidents with more narrowly defined strategies and tactics.

Determining the Suitability of Available Personal Protective Equipment

Due to the nature of hazmat incidents, responders must be able to use SOPs and other resources to determine if their PPE is adequate to perform their assigned tasks at an incident. If PPE is determined to be inadequate, the IAP will need to be revised.

PPE requirements may differ depending on the following:

• Responder’s mission/assignment
• Product(s) involved
• Circumstances at the incident, for example, in a confined space

Identifying Emergency Decontamination Needs

If responders or the public come into contact with (or potentially contact) hazardous materials, it may be necessary to remove the hazardous material as quickly as possible. This process is called emergency decontamination (emergency decon). If responders or the public exhibit signs and symptoms of exposure to hazardous materials or product is visible on their skin or clothing, emergency decon should be considered.

Implementing Response Objectives and Action Options

The purpose of the IAP is to develop the necessary strategy and tactics to affect a positive and safe outcome. Once the strategies are in place, tactics are developed. Tactics are the operational tasks that are used to accomplish the strategies. Tactics should be measurable in both time and performance. They should be evaluated to ensure that they will meet the strategic goals that were put in place.

Some typical hazmat strategies and tactics that you may be assigned to implement are presented in the following sections, including:

• Hazard-control zones
• Protection of the public
• Product control
• Emergency decontamination
• Protection of responders
• Protection of the environment and property
• Fire control
• Evidence preservation

Hazard-Control Zones

Hazard-control zones provide the scene control required at hazmat and terrorist incidents to:

• Prevent interference by unauthorized persons.
• Help regulate first responders’ movements within the zones.
• Minimize contamination (including secondary contamination from exposed or potentially exposed victims).
• Help ensure accountability of all personnel operating at large, multiagency response incidents.

Hazard-control zones divide the levels of hazard of an incident, and what a zone is called generally depicts this level. These zones are often referred to as hot, warm, and cold (Figure 25.27). While typically represented as concentric circles, control zones take whatever shape is needed, often dictated by the features of the location and incident. Control zones are not necessarily static and can be adjusted as the incident changes.

The Canadian Centre for Occupational Health and Safety (CCOHS) and Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC) refer to these zones are also referred to as site safety zones or hazard-control zones.

The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) refer to these zones collectively as site work zones. They are sometimes called scene-control zones. Other countries may use different terminology for these zones.

Different agencies may have different control zone needs. At incidents involving crimes, law enforcement may designate a zone to incorporate the entire crime scene, and this zone may not correspond to traditional fire service activities. For example, at terrorist incidents in the U.S., the FBI establishes an evidence search perimeter 1.5 times the distance of the farthest known piece of evidence (Figure 25.28). These law enforcement zones might change as evidence is processed and the crime scene is released. When establishing these zones, the crime scene dynamics may create a need for flexibility on the part of all agencies in the Unified Command.

Incidents involving bombs are an example of where traditional control zones and the operations that are usually conducted within those zones may vary. Because of the blast effects, there may be multiple buildings in danger of collapse, which will require the designation of a much larger hot zone.

In order to preserve evidence in a bombing incident, law enforcement may require that the hot zone be extended out as far as the perimeter of the debris field. In these cases, there will likely be tight perimeter control as well as a large hot zone (Figure 25.29). Due to these logistics, responders may need to conduct operations such as triage, treatment, and transportation, in an area designated as the hot zone.

An event that has multiple devices or release points is unique to terrorist events and may require a nontraditional scene management plan. In these cases, there may be more than one hot zone for a given incident. Whether the incident involves bombs or multiple devices, it is necessary for the Incident Commander to remain flexible and establish a scene management plan and control zones to meet the needs of all of the responders to the incident. Responders at the incident must be made aware of control zones as they are established.

Hot Zone

Traditionally, the hot zone (also called exclusion zone) is an area surrounding an incident that is potentially dangerous either because it presents a threat in the form of a hazardous material or the effects thereof. The area may be contaminated by chemical warfare agents, or it may have the potential to become contaminated by a released hazardous material. The area has been or could be exposed to the gases, vapours, mists, dusts, or runoff of the material. Responders must have proper training and wear appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) to work in  the hot zone or to support work being done inside the hot zone. There will be established access and egress points to ensure both accountability and designated PPE prior to entry.

The hot zone extends far enough to prevent people outside the zone from suffering ill effects from the released material, explosion, or other threat. Work performed inside the hot zone is often limited to highly trained personnel such as SWAT teams, US&R teams, hazardous materials technicians, Joint Hazard Assessment Teams (JHAT), mission specific operations, and bomb technicians (EOD personnel).

Warm Zone

The warm zone (also called contamination reduction zone or corridor) is an area adjoining the hot zone and extending to the cold zone (see following section). The warm zone serves as a buffer between the hot and cold zones and as the decontamination location for personnel and equipment exiting the hot zone.

Decontamination usually takes place within a corridor (decon corridor) located in the warm zone (Figure 25.30). At incidents involving crimes, parts of the warm zone may be part of the crime scene; responders should create minimal disturbance. PPE will normally be required in this zone, although in some circumstances it may be at a reduced level from the hot zone. Monitoring and detection may be conducted around the perimeter of the warm zone to determine the extent of the hazards. The Unified Commander or the IC will approve the level of PPE required for work within this zone after input from others.

Cold Zone

The cold zone (also called support zone) surrounds the warm zone and is used to carry out all logistical support functions of the incident. Workers in the cold zone are not required to wear PPE because the zone is considered safe. However, some personnel may still be wearing PPE (such as body armour) in case of secondary devices and/ or attacks to ensure safe evacuation in the case of rapid expansion of the hot zone.

The Cold Zone is the site for the following:

• Multiagency Command post (CP)
• Donning/doffing area
• Staging area
• Backup teams
• Research teams
• Logistical support
• Criminal investigation teams
• Transportation areas
• Triage/treatment/rehabilitation (rehab)

Staging

The staging area needs to be located in an isolated spot in a safe area where occupants cannot interfere with on-going operations. Staging minimizes confusion and freelancing at the scene. Staging areas should be located at spots in the cold zone where occupants cannot interfere with ongoing operations. A safe direction of travel to the staging area should be broadcast to all resources responding to the incident. Ideally, emergency responders and equipment at terrorist incidents should be staged between multiple locations in case staging areas are attacked. Some departments use the concept of a cornering/quartering staging procedure (Figure 25.31).

This has two basic purposes.

1. Spreads out emergency response personnel from one another to limit their exposure as a target and minimizes the effects of a secondary type of attack/device.
2. Allows personnel to envelop the scene and provide multiple treatment areas or operation function points.

Protection of Responders

The first priority at any incident is the protection and safety of emergency responders. Injured or incapacitated responders are unable to assist in mitigation efforts or protection of the public.

Measures to protect responders include the following:

• Staying uphill, upstream, and upwind of hazardous materials
• Wearing appropriate PPE
• Using time, distance, and shielding for protection
• Decontaminating responders when necessary
• Ensuring accountability of all personnel
• Tracking and identifying all personnel working at an incident
• Working as part of a team or buddy system
• Assigning safety officers
• Putting evacuation and escape procedures in place

The following sections describe some of these measures in greater detail. Wearing PPE During a risk-based response, responders must wear appropriate PPE to protect against hazards. The AHJ issues personal protective equipment, and responders must be trained in its selection, use, and maintenance. They must be aware of thermal issues such as heat stress.

Accountability Systems All personnel and equipment assigned to the incident must be tracked via an accountability system (Figure 25.32). Most units responding to an incident arrive fully staffed and ready to be assigned an operational objective; other personnel may have to be formed into units at the scene.

To handle these and other differences in the available resources, the IAP must contain a tracking and accountability system that has the following elements:

• Procedure for checking in at the scene
• Way of identifying and tracking the location of each unit and all personnel on scene
• Procedure for releasing people, equipment, and apparatus that are no longer needed Accountability systems are especially important for incidents involving multiple agencies and organizations.

All these agencies may have different levels of PPE and training. The agency/organization in command is responsible for tracking all responders, not just their own. Therefore, determine methods for tracking accountability in pre-plans and implement them as soon as possible at the incident scene.

Types of accountability systems include:

• Fire service passport systems
• T-card systems for wildland incidents
• GPS and GIS NOTE: NFPA 1500 and 1561 address accountability system requirements.

Buddy Systems and Backup Personnel

NFPA and OSHA mandate the use of buddy systems and backup personnel at hazmat incidents. A buddy system organizes personnel into workgroups containing at least two members so that nobody works alone. The buddy system’s primary benefit is to provide rapid help if there is an emergency; if one person becomes incapacitated, the other can call for help and provide immediate assistance. In addition to using the buddy system, backup personnel must be in place and prepared to enter the hot zone with appropriate equipment to provide assistance or rescue if necessary. Backup personnel must be dressed in the same level of personal protective clothing as entry personnel (Figure 25.33).

Time, Distance, and Shielding

Using time, distance, and shielding is an effective strategy to protect first responders at hazmat incidents. The following describes the ways in which these strategies protect responders:

• Time: Limiting the time to which responders are exposed (or potentially exposed) to hazards and hazardous materials reduces the likelihood they will suffer serious harm. To limit the time of hazard exposure, restrict work times in the hot zone, and frequently rotate personnel on work groups.
• Distance: Maximizing distance from potential hazards will often prevent or reduce harm. The closer a responder is to the source of an explosion, the greater the harmful effects will be. Staying away from hazardous areas will also prevent harmful exposures. Distance may be controlled by implementing hazard-control zones.
• Shielding: Shielding places a physical barrier between a responder and the hazard. Shielding may consist of wearing PPE or positioning personnel so that another object, such as a wall, building, or apparatus, is between the responder and the hazard, thereby minimizing the chance of contact or harmful effect.

Evacuation/Escape Procedures

At hazmat incidents, a signalling system should be used that will advise personnel inside the danger area when to evacuate. The FEMA US&R Task Force program has developed a system for evacuating rescuers from dangerous areas.

Notification can be made using devices such as:

• Handheld CO2 boat air horns
• Air horns on fire apparatus
• Vehicle horns

Other communication methods in the event of an emergency can include portable radios, voice, hand signals, and the use of other predetermined signals. The US&R designated signals and their meanings are as follows:

• Cease Operations/All Quiet: one long blast (three seconds)
• Evacuate the Area: three short blasts (one second each)
• Resume Operations: one long and one short blast

Responders must also plan multiple escape procedures. If the primary means of egress becomes blocked, rescuers should determine the possibility of using the alternate route.

Protection of the Public

Measures to protect the public include such operations as conducting rescues, performing mass decontamination, and providing emergency medical care and first aid. Additional measures include evacuation, sheltering in place, and protecting/defending in place. The IC selects the best option (or combination of options) based on the incident.

Rescue

Based on the nature of the incident, victims may be found in a variety of locations, such as out in the open or within a structure or a confined space. Before attempting a rescue, evaluate the location and viability of the victim as well as available tools and equipment. If the decision is made to attempt a rescue, safety should be a paramount concern. The IC makes decisions about rescue based on a variety of factors at the incident.

The following factors affect the ability of personnel to perform a rescue:

• Nature of the hazardous material and incident severity
• Training
• Availability of appropriate PPE
• Availability of monitoring equipment
• Number of victims and their conditions
• Time needed to complete a rescue
• Tools, equipment, and other devices needed to perform the rescue

First responders without Mission-Specific training should avoid contact with hazardous materials. Viable victims who are contaminated should be moved as carefully as possible, and transferred to the care of medical responders located within the initial-isolation zone or hot zone.

If there are injured victims at the scene, first responders must always be aware of the potential dangers of contamination and the need to decontaminate as part of the treatment process. They must follow local procedures for determining prioritization of emergency medical care and decontamination.

Actions that can be taken without risk of contamination include:

• Directing people to an area of safe refuge or evacuation point located in a safe place within the hot zone that is upwind and uphill of the hazard area.
• Instructing victims to move to an area that is less dangerous before moving them to an area that offers complete safety.
• Directing contaminated or potentially contaminated victims to an isolation point, safe refuge area, safety shower, eyewash facility, or decontamination area (Figure 25.34).
• Giving directions to a large number of people for mass decontamination.
• Conducting searches during reconnaissance or defensive activities.
• Conducting searches on the edge of the hot zone.

Evacuation

To evacuate means to move all people from a threatened area to a safer place. To perform an evacuation, there must be enough time to warn people, for them to prepare to leave, and for them to leave the area by a safe route (uphill, upwind, etc.). Generally, if there is enough time for evacua-tion, it is the best protective action. Emergency responders should begin evacuating people who are most threatened by the incident in accordance with distances recommended by the ERG, pre-incident surveys, or other sources. Even after people move these recommended distances, they are not necessarily completely safe from harm. Do not permit evacuees to congregate at the scene. Instead, send them to a designated place (or area of safe refuge) along a specific route. The number of responders needed to perform an evacuation varies with the size of the area and number of people to evacuate. Evacuation can be an expensive, labour-intensive operation; therefore, it is important to assign enough personnel resources to conduct it. Evacuation and traffic-control activities on the downwind side could cause responders and evacuees to become contaminated and, consequently, need decontamination. Responders may also need to wear PPE to safely conduct the evacuation. The local emergency response plan should include a preplan for evacuation (including casualties) for likely terrorist targets such as stadiums and other public gathering places.

The IC must address the following factors regarding large-scale evacuations:

• Notification: Alert the public of the need to evacuate and tell them where they should go.
  • The local emergency response plan details the notification methods.

  • 

    Relay clear and concise information to avoid confusion or additional panic.

  • Notification methods include:
    • Knocking on doors
    • Public address systems
    • Radio
    • TV
    • Sirens
    • Building alarms
  • Short message service (SMS) through cell phones (text messages)
    • Reverse 9-1-1
    • Emergency Alerting System (EAS, in the United States)
    • Loudspeakers mounted on helicopters or emergency vehicles
    • Electronic billboards
• Transportation: Plan in advance, alternate means of transportation, such as school buses, public transit systems, planes, trains, boats, barges, and ferries (Figure 25.35).

• 

  Relocation facilities and temporary shelters: Designate appropriate evacuation shelters in the local emergency response plan. Determine staffing arrangements in advance. Shelters must be able to provide food, water, medicine, bathroom and shower facilities, and places to sleep (for evacuations of long duration) (Figure 25.36). Establish an information/registration system to track the whereabouts of evacuees so their friends and relatives can find them.

• Re-entry: Consider how people will be allowed to return to evacuated areas.

Individuals who have been exposed or potentially exposed to chemical, biological, or radiological agents must be decontaminated. While it may be impossible to keep these individuals at the scene, efforts to keep them in place should be made in order to prevent the spread of harmful or potentially deadly materials to other locations. Evacuate contaminated or potentially contaminated individuals to an area of safe refuge (or a triage and treatment area as appropriate) within the isolation perimeter to await decontamination. Because victims may leave the scene before emergency responders arrive (or ignore requests to stay in order to undergo decon), shelters, hospitals, and other public health care facilities must be prepared to conduct decon of people who walk in on their own or with help from others.

Sheltering in Place

Sheltering in place means to direct people to go quickly inside or to stay inside a room or a building and remain inside until danger passes. Some situations may make sheltering in place preferable to evacuation.

The decision to shelter in place may be guided by the following factors:

• The population is unable to initiate evacuation because of health care, detention, or educational occupancies.
• The material is spreading too rapidly to allow time for evacuation.
• The material is too toxic to risk any exposure.
• Vapours are heavier than air, and people are in a high-rise or multi-level structure (Figure 25.37).

When protecting people inside a structure, close all doors, windows, heating, ventilation and air-conditioning systems. Vehicles are not as effective as buildings for sheltering in place, but they can offer temporary protection if windows are closed and the ventilation system is turned off. First responders should also pay attention to the condition of surrounding buildings before ordering sheltering in place. Some areas may have old and dilapidated structures without air-conditioning or with openings between floorboards. Sheltering in place might not provide sufficient protection in such cases, making evacuation the better option.

Similarly, evacuation may be a better option than sheltering in place when explosive vapours or gases are involved, for two reasons:

1. These vapours or gases may take a long time to dissipate from the surrounding environment. 
2. Vapours or gases may permeate into any building that cannot be sealed from the outside atmosphere.

Whether using evacuation or shelter in place, inform the public as early as possible and provide additional instructions and information throughout the course of an emergency. Sheltering in place may be more effective if public education has been initiated ahead of the incident via emergency planning.

Protecting/Defending in Place

Protecting/defending in place is an active (offensive) role or aggressive posture to physically protect those individuals in harm’s way. When appropriate and safe to do so, defending in place eliminates the need for unnecessary evacuations, which, if initiated, will require additional logistical support to ensure the health and safety of civilians who are protected in place.

Actions that may be taken during this kind of operation include:

• Using hose streams to diffuse a plume (Figure 25.38)
• Securing a neighbourhood or area
• Turning off HVAC systems to minimize spread of contaminants

Protection of the Environment and Property 

Exposure protection is a defensive control tactic. Most firefighters should be familiar with the concept of protecting exposures in fire situations, usually in terms of protecting property that is exposed to a fire in order to keep it from spreading. However, at the hazmat scene, the same concept includes protecting the environment and protecting property that is threatened by an expanding incident (including closed containers and piping). Protecting environment and property includes both protecting exposures from fires involving hazardous materials and protecting the environment from the harmful effects of hazardous materials that are not burning. For example, diking a storm drain is a tactic that protects the environment from being exposed to (and harmed by) potentially toxic materials (Figure 25.39).  

Protecting the Environment

Environmental damage is also an important concern. The air, surface water, wildlife, water table, and land surrounding an incident may be seriously affected by released materials. Water used during fire-control activities may become contaminated with pollutants or other hazardous materials. The non-biodegradable nature of many materials means that the consequences of contamination may take years for the full effect to be realized. The result of contamination may also require large sums of money to repair. All released materials and runoff need to be confined and held until their effect on the environment can be determined. 

Protecting Property

The property risk at hazardous materials incidents is similar to that created by other fire hazards except that the threatening material may not always be readily evident. Flammable and toxic gases, mists, and vapours can contaminate and pose an ignition threat with no visible signs. Protective actions must be tailored to the material, its properties, and any reactions to the proposed protective medium. ICs may appropriately decide not to save property when operations pose a risk. Lives or the environment must not be unduly compromised to save property.

Product Control

When hazardous materials escape their containers, emergency responders may need to perform product control at incidents. There are two main product control strategies, one primarily defensive, and one offensive. Spill control is a defensive strategy that attempts to confine a hazardous material that has been released from its container. Leak control is an offensive strategy that attempts to contain a material in its original container, or transfer it to another container (Figure 25.40).

Fire Control

Most hazmat incidents involve flammable materials. Fire control is the strategy used to prevent ignition and/or extinguish the fire when hazardous materials are involved. Tactics may include using fire fighting foam or water depending on the situation and the product involved.

Evidence Recognition and Preservation

Incidents involving WMDs or other illegal activities are crimes, and the locations where they occur are crime scenes. Notify law enforcement as soon as a crime is suspected. Fire service first responders should not collect evidence, unless collection is absolutely necessary to preserve the evidence. First responders need to identify and preserve evidence so that the investigator can collect and properly document it per the AHJ. Local emergency response plans should spell out responsibilities of individual agencies at such incidents as well as detail the acceptable procedures and techniques to be used.

First responders should preserve evidence so that investigators can identify and successfully prosecute guilty parties. The more the scene is disturbed, the more difficulties investigators encounter when attempting to develop a clear and accurate picture of what actually occurred. Law enforcement must gather accurate, acceptable  information about the crime to be used in court.

Even seemingly irrelevant things can have tremendous significance to forensic experts and other law enforcement investigators, including:

• Footprints
• Victim locations
• Wrapping paper
• Containers
• Vehicles in the vicinity
• Location of witnesses and bystanders
• Debris placement Evidence can take many forms.

Items that look like trash may be pieces of a bomb or an incendiary device. Evidence can include everything from body fluids to tire tracks to cigarette butts. The pattern of scattered debris may tell investigators about the force of an explosion (and consequently, how big the bomb was). Residue on debris can help identify what explosive materials were used. Clothing and jewelry removed from victims are considered evidence. At illegal clandestine labs, evidence may include fingerprints, weapons, chemical containers, notes, letters, and papers.

Evidence can be anything; therefore, responders must — to the degree possible — avoid disturbing a scene. The preservation of life is more important than the preservation of evidence. Lifesaving operations take precedence.

As soon as it is known or suspected that criminal or terrorist activity is involved at an incident, first responders should do the following to help preserve evidence and assist law enforcement:

• DO NOT touch anything unless it is necessary.
• Avoid disturbing areas not directly involved in rescue activities.
• Remember what the scene looked like upon first arrival as well as details about the progression of the incident.
• Note as many of the W’s as possible: who, what, when, where, and why.
  • If possible, pay attention to the following:
    • Who was present (including victims, people running from the scene, people acting suspiciously, bystanders, and potential witnesses).
    • What happened.
    • When important events occurred.
    • Where objects/people/animals were located.
    • Why events unfolded as they did.

• 

  Document observations as quickly as possible. While it may be quite some time before responders have the opportunity, the sooner information is written down, the more accurate it will probably be. This documentation may be used as evidence for legal proceedings.

• Take photographs and videos of the scene as soon as possible (Figure 25.41).
• Remember and document when something was touched or moved. Document in the report where it was and where it was placed. Photograph the item before doing anything if possible. DO NOT try to recreate the scene as it looked before something was touched or moved. In other words, do not move something back into the position you found it in after you have already moved it.
• Minimize the number of people working in the area if possible. Establish travel routes that minimize disturbance (Figure 25.42).
• Leave fatalities and their surroundings undisturbed.
• Isolate and secure areas where evidence is found, and report findings to law enforcement authorities.
• Identify witnesses, victims, and the presence of evidence. Investigators will want to interview witnesses and victims as part of their investigations. Advise witnesses to remain at the scene in a safe location until they have been interviewed and released.
• Preserve potentially transient physical evidence (evidence present on victims or evidence such as chemical residue, body fluids, or footprints) that may be compromised by weather conditions.
• Have evidence collection points (such as ground tarps) located near decontamination corridors and hot zone exit locations to gather evidence during decon or doffing operations.
• At chemical or biological incidents, secure and isolate restaurants or food vendors near the incident area in the event contaminated food can be used as evidence.
• Follow predetermined procedures regarding operations at crime scenes.

Lesson 6

Terrorist Attacks

Terrorists have the knowledge and the capability to strike anywhere in the world, and they deliberately target locations where civilians are present. All societies are vulnerable to incidents involving terrorism, although countries in conflict are especially vulnerable. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) heads U.S. government agencies in investigating and attempt-ing to prevent terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. There are many different definitions of terrorism; however, the FBI defines terrorism as the unlawful use of force against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in the furtherance of political or social objectives.

Under this definition, all terrorist activities share the following three commitments:

1. Using force that involves illegal activities
2. Intimidation or coercion
3. Supporting political or social objectives

Under other definitions, terrorism may not require the use of force. Terrorism may be defined as the unlawful or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce and intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives. The decision to engage in criminal, intimidating activities to achieve goals separates a terrorist organization from a legitimate organization. However, any organization, legitimate or not, can resort to terrorist means to achieve its political or social agenda. Terrorists can operate as a group or act alone.

Terrorist organizations plan activities that will have an emotional effect on the target population. They desire the target population to react to their attacks and demands in a manner that furthers their goals. Terrorism is designed to cause disruption, fear, and panic. Terrorists may want to draw attention to their cause, coerce or intimidate governments into granting their demands, or provoke governments into repressive actions that may inspire oppressed masses to revolt.

Terrorists are difficult to stop, even when security precautions are taken and attacks are expected. An act of terrorism can occur anywhere, at any time. Terrorists will attack targets on land, sea, or air (Figure 25.43). No jurisdiction — urban, suburban, or rural — is immune from terrorist acts. Because terrorist and criminal incidents may differ from ordinary hazmat incidents, there are some specific, unique actions that need to be taken, such as immediately notifying law enforcement (Figure 25.44). You should also be alert for secondary devices and booby traps since terrorists and criminals may deliberately target first responders or crowds.

Awareness Level Personnel

As true at all hazmat incidents, Awareness Level personnel should do all of the following:

• Protect yourself and others by isolating the incident and denying entry.
• Prevent contaminated persons and animals from leaving the scene, if possible, and direct them to a safe area to wait for help.
• Avoid contacting contaminants or contaminated surfaces.

Remember that WMD agents may be deadly in very small amounts, and biological agents may not cause symptoms for several days. Finally, Awareness Level personnel are likely to be on or near the scene when an incident or attack occurs, and therefore they make important witnesses. Law enforcement will want to know what you saw and when.

In addition, if it can be done safely, you should do the following:

• Document your observations.
• Take pictures, if possible.
• Make note of other witnesses and observers at the scene.
• Protect evidence at the crime scene as best as you can.

Terrorism and Emergency Response

During the initial part of the response, emergency responders may not know if the incident is a terrorist act or something else. The same Incident Management System applies to all operations. Emergency responders will still respond and be among the first on the scene and consider traditional strategies and tactics to manage the incident. Responders will use the same risk-based response procedures to ensure safety and protection of themselves and the public. The size and type of incident plays a key role in how the response is managed. It may take some time before responders identify an incident as a terrorist attack.

Many emergency response organizations may have supplies, equipment, and emergency response plans for other disasters that will work for terrorist incidents. PPE used for illicit drug lab responses and other hazmat incidents may also provide protection at a terrorist incident, depending on the materials involved. Similarly, decontamination tents, trailers, and equipment will serve the same purpose at terrorist incidents as at hazmat incidents. Responders can adapt existing evacuation plans to suit conditions created during a terrorist incident.

Targeted Versus Non-targeted Incidents

Despite their many similarities, important differences exist between terrorist incidents and other emergencies. Differences between non-targeted emergencies and a targeted attack are explained in the following:

• Intent: An act of terrorism is intended to cause damage, inflict harm, and kill. Terrorists specifically target the public, first responders, or both. Most other emergency incidents are not criminal in nature. A secondary attack is a deliberate release of hazardous materials that may cause widespread harm, regardless of any intent to target any audience.
• Severity and Complexity: Terrorist events may involve large numbers of casualties. They may involve materials, such as radioactive materials, with which first responders have little experience. Secondary contamination from handling patients may present a hazard. Structural collapse and other dangers may occur significantly after the initial attack. Issues, such as securing the scene and managing the incident, may be especially complex and difficult because of the large area involved (Figure 25.45).

• 

  Crime Scene Management: At terrorist incidents, responders must preserve evidence and notify law enforcement as soon as possible (Figure 25.46). Responders must quickly recognize a terrorist attack. Failure to act quickly could result in the loss or accidental destruction of valuable information.

• Command Structure: A Unified Command Structure is required at most terrorist incidents. Law enforcement will have jurisdiction over all incidents involving terrorism.

Identification of Terrorist Attacks

The following are a few examples of situations that can cue the responder to consider the possibility of a terrorist attack:

• Report of two or more medical emergencies in public locations such as a shopping mall, transportation hub, mass transit system, office building, assembly occupancy, or other public buildings
• Unusually large number of people with similar medical signs and symptoms arriving at physicians’ offices or medical emergency rooms
• Reported explosion at a movie theatre department store, office building, government building, or a location with historical or symbolic significance
• Additional information can provide clues as to the type of attack.

CBRNE attacks (chemical, biological, radio-logical, nuclear, and explosive attacks) each have their own unique indicators (Table 25.2). Monitoring and detection devices also play an important role in determining which of these materials may be present at the incident scene. If criminal or terrorist activity is suspected at an incident, first responders must quickly forward that information to law enforcement representatives.

Terrorist Tactics and Types of Attacks

Traditional terrorist tactics include assassination, armed assault, and bombings (including suicide bombings). Some conventional attacks may produce devastating effects equal to or exceeding those produced by the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). For example, assassination of a political leader could affect regime stability, or the use of conventional weapons could produce mass casualties and destruction exceeding the response capability of the community. Tactics such as cyber terrorism and agro-terrorism (also called agricultural terrorism) present threats to computer/network security and food supplies.

Potential Terrorist Targets

Certain occupancies are more likely to be terrorist targets than others. Terrorists are likely to target locations where an attack has the potential to do the greatest harm, such as:

• Killing or injuring persons
• Causing panic and/or disruption
• Damaging the economy
• Destroying property
• Demoralizing the community

When the goal is to kill as many people as possible, any location or occupancy that has large public gatherings, such as football stadiums, sports arenas, theatres, and shopping malls, might become a potential target. Terrorists might also target places with historical, economic, or symbolic significance such as local monuments, high-profile buildings, or high-traffic bridges.

Scrutinize reported incidents at these occupancies closely for potential terrorist involvement. If you suspect terrorism, notify law enforcement authorities immediately. WMD Threat Spectrum Experts have not reached consensus on which types of WMDs first responders are most likely to encounter. However, given the availability of parts, relative ease of production, and ease of deployment.

The following list is a probable WMD threat spectrum from most likely to least likely:

1. Explosives: Such as IEDs, vehicle bombs, and suicide bombers, also explosives potentially combined with other materials such as industrial chemicals, biological materials, or radiological materials (Figure 25.47)
2. Biological toxins: Such as ricin
3. Industrial chemicals: Such as chlorine and phosgene
4. Biological pathogens: Such as contagious diseases
5. Radiological materials: Such as those used in a radiological dispersal device
6. Military-grade chemical weapons: Such as nerve agents
7. Nuclear weapons: Such as nuclear bombs

Explosives and conventional attacks have been terrorists’ weapons of choice throughout history, and most experts agree that explosives are the greatest WMD threat today.

This book will present this spectrum in the following order:

• Explosive attacks
• Chemical attacks
• Biological attacks
• Radiological and nuclear attacks

Secondary Attacks and Booby Traps

There is always the possibility that secondary devices will be used at terrorist attacks. Secondary devices are used to create more chaos and injure responders and bystanders. Usually, secondary devices are explosives of some kind, most likely an improvised explosive device (IED).

Secondary devices may also be deployed as a diversionary tactic to route emergency responders away from the primary attack area. Secondary devices will be hidden or camouflaged. A time delay may detonate the devices, but other devices are also used, such as radio-controlled and cell-phone-activated devices. In some cases, an obvious IED may be used to lure personnel to a specific area where a less obvious IED is hidden. Booby traps may be set to protect illicit laboratories (Figure 25.48).

Booby traps may use explosive, chemical, biological, or radiological materials. Some may use animals such as snakes or guard dogs. If any time booby traps or secondary devices are found or suspected, contact law enforcement and/or explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)/ bomb squad personnel.

To protect against possible secondary devices, use the following guidelines:

• Anticipate the presence of a secondary device at any suspicious incident.
• Conduct a visual search for a secondary device (or anything suspicious) before moving into the incident area.
• Limit the numbers of emergency response personnel to those performing critical tasks (rescue) until the area has been checked and it has been confirmed that no additional devices are present.
• Avoid touching or moving anything that may conceal an explosive device (including items such as backpacks and purses).
• Manage the scene with cordons, boundaries, and scene control zones.
• Evacuate victims and nonessential personnel as quickly as possible.
• Preserve the scene as much as possible for evidence collection and crime investigation.

While secondary devices and booby traps can be disguised as almost anything, responders should look for things that may seem out of place (Figure 25.49). If anything suspicious is found, responders should note the item, treat the item with appropriate caution, notify appropriate personnel (law enforcement/ Explosive Ordnance Disposal/bomb squad personnel), and evacuate the area immediately.

Be cautious of any item(s) that arouse(s) curiosity, including the following:

• Containers with unknown liquids or materials
• Unusual devices or containers with electronic components, such as:
  • Wires
  • Circuit boards
  • Cellular phones
  • Antennas
  • Other items attached or exposed
  • Devices containing quantities of the following:
    • Fuses
    • Fireworks
    • Match heads
    • Black powder
      

      
    • Smokeless powder
    • Incendiary materials
    • Other unusual materials
• Materials, such as nails, bolts, drill bits, and marbles, attached to or surrounding an item that could be used for shrapnel (Figure 25.50).
• Ordnance such as blasting caps, detonation cord (detcord), military explosives, commercial explosives, and grenades
• Devices, such as razor blades and trip wires, on containers or other items on handles, valves, ladders, or other locations
• Energized bare electrical wiring or exposed metal surfaces connected to an electrical system
• Any combination of the previously described items

Explosive Attacks

Explosive devices can be anything from homemade pipe bombs to sophisticated military ordnance. For example, the truck bomb that exploded April 19, 1995, outside the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people and injuring many others, is testimony to the potential destructive power of simple resources. The following sections describe explosive attacks.

Explosive/Incendiary Attack Indicators

The majority of terrorist attacks involves the use of explosive materials and incendiary devices, and typically are considered conventional attacks (Figure 25.51). However, explosives, such as with a car or truck bomb, destroying an occupied building may be classified as weapons of mass destruction when used to inflict high casualties. Explosives may also be used to disseminate chemical, biological, and radiological materials..

Explosive/incendiary attack indicators include:

• Warning or threat of an attack or received intelligence
• Reports of an explosion
• Explosion
• Accelerant odours (such as gasoline)
• Multiple fires or explosions
• Incendiary device or bomb components (such as broken glass from a Molotov cocktail or wreckage of a car bomb)
• Unexpectedly heavy burning or high temperatures
  

  

• Unusually fast burning fires
• Unusually coloured smoke or flames
• Presence of propane or other flammable gas cylinders in unusual locations
• Unattended packages, backpacks, or objects left in high traffic/public areas
• Fragmentation damage/injury
• Damage that exceeds the level usually seen during gas explosions, including shattered reinforced concrete or bent structural steel (Figure 25.52)
• Crater(s)
• Scattering of small metal objects such as nuts, bolts, and/or nails used as shrapnel

Classification of Explosives

Most commonly, explosives are categorized by chemical reaction or rate of decomposition. In general, high explosives create a larger effect, in sound and size, than low explosives.

•  High Explosives: High explosives decompose rapidly (almost instantaneously) in a detonation that can include velocities faster than the speed of sound.

  • 

    High explosives are placarded as DOT Division Number 1.1.

  • Examples of high explosives that are available for legal purchase include:
    • Plastic explosives, such as C3 and C4 (Figure 25.53)
    • Nitroglycerin
    • TNT
    • Blasting caps
    • Dynamite
    • Ammonium nitrate and fuel oil (ANFO) and other blasting agents (Figure 25.55)

• 

  Low Explosives: Low explosive materials decompose rapidly but do not produce an explosive effect unless they are confined. In other words, they deflagrate at a speed slower than the speed of sound.

  • Low explosives confined in small spaces or containers are commonly used as propellants.
  • Low explosives are placarded as DOT Division Number 1.4.
  • Black powder, a low explosive, is used to propel bullets and fireworks.
  • Other examples of low explosives are the pyrotechnic substances used in fireworks and road flares.
  • Some agencies may refer to unconfined low explosives as incendiary materials.
  • Many experts do not distinguish incendiary devices/materials from other low explosives.
• Primary and Secondary Explosives
  • Primary explosives are generally more sensitive than secondary explosives (Figure 25.56).
  • Emergency responders should also be familiar with the following classifications based on high explosives’ susceptibility to initiation (or sensitivity):
    • Primary explosives: Easily initiated and highly sensitive to heat and usually used as detonators.
      

      

      • Small amounts of primary explosives, even a single grain or crystal, can detonate.
      • Examples of primary explosives are lead azide, mercury fulminate, and lead styphnate
• Secondary explosives: Designed to detonate only under specific circumstances usually by activation energy from a primary explosive.
  • Secondary explosives are less sensitive than primary explosives to initiating stimuli, such as heat or flame.
  • TNT is an example of a secondary explosive.
• Tertiary explosives (blasting agents): Insensitive materials based on ammonium nitrate (AN); they usually require initiation from a secondary explosive.
  • Not all experts recognize this category and would consider blasting agents to be secondary explosives.

Commercial/Military Explosives

Commercial and military explosives are normally used for such legitimate purposes as mining, demolition, excavation, construction, and military applications (Table 25.3). Unfortunately, criminals and terrorists may also attempt to steal and use explosives. Homemade/Improvised Explosive Materials Nonmilitary first responders are more likely to encounter homemade or improvised explosive materials than military weapons in their day-to-day response activities. Responders typically stage 300 meters (1 000 feet) away from a suspected explosive material incident. Improvised explosive materials are typically made by combining an oxidizer with a fuel (Figure 25.57). Many of these materials are fairly simple to make and require very little technical expertise or specialized equipment. However, the explosive materials created are often highly unstable. More than one potential terrorist has died trying to make homemade explosives (HME). The following sections describe peroxide-based explosives, chlorate-based explosives, and nitrate-based explosives. These categories do not represent a comprehensive list; many oxidizers and fuels can be combined to form improvised explosive materials.

Peroxide-Based Explosives

Peroxide-based explosives are made by mixing concentrated hydrogen peroxide, acetone, and either hydrochloric or sulfuric acid. Peroxide-based explosives include triacetone triperoxide (TATP) and hexamethylene triperoxide diamine (HMTD). Both TATP and HMTD are unstable during the manufacturing process and also as a finished product. This lack of stability makes them dangerous to make and handle. On the other hand, specialized equipment is not required for the manufacture of TATP and HMTD, so they can be produced almost anywhere.

Chlorate-Based Explosives

Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) may contain chlorate-based oxidizers. Chlorate-based oxidizers commonly take the form of a white crystal or powder that must be mixed with a fuel source. Chlorates are a common ingredient in some fireworks and can be purchased in bulk from fireworks and chemical supply houses. Many manufacturing processes and many products use chlorates, including printing, dying, steel, weed killer, matches, and explosives. Nitrate-Based Explosives. Some IEDs may contain nitrate-based oxidizers, and some may already have a fuel source included, such as black powder and smokeless powder. Other explosives may require the addition of a separate fuel source.

 Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)

Depending on sophistication, IEDs are relatively easy to make and can be constructed in almost any location or setting. IEDs are not commercially manufactured; they are homemade. They are usually constructed for a specific target and can be contained within almost any object (Figures 25.58). Inexperienced designers may create IEDs that fail to detonate or, in some cases, detonate during the building process or when being moved or placed. Some bomb makers specialize in IED manufacture and make more sophisticated varieties. These sophisticated devices may be constructed with components scavenged from conventional munitions and standard consumer electronics components, such as speaker wire, cellular phones, or garage door openers (Figure 25.59). IEDs often include nails, tacks, broken glass, bolts, and other items that will cause additional shrapnel damage and fragmentation injuries.

Identification of IEDs

The bomber’s imagination is the only limitation to the design and implementation of IEDs. Be cautious of any item(s) that attract attention because they seem out of place, anomalous, out of the ordi-nary, curious, suspicious, out of context, or unusual. IEDs may be placed anywhere. Usually, bombers try to avoid detection when placing IEDs. The level of security and awareness of the public, security forces, and employees affect where and how a terrorist will place an IED.

IED Types Categorized by Containers

IEDs are typically categorized by their container and the way in which they are initiated. Bomb types, based on the outer container, can include features similar to the following descriptions.

You can identify types of IEDs by their method of transportation or delivery:

• Pipe bombs (Figure 25.60).
• Satchel, backpack, knapsack, duffle bag, briefcase, or box bombs (Figure 25.61)
• Plastic bottle bombs
• Fireworks
• M-Devices
• Carbon Dioxide (CO2 ) Grenades
• Tennis ball bombs
• Other existing objects (Figure 25.62).

Mail, Package, or Letter Bombs

A package or letter may be used to conceal the explosive device or material. Opening the package or letter usually triggers the bomb. Opening the package or letter usually triggers the bomb.

Person-Borne Improvised Explosives Devices (PBIEDs). Person-Borne Improvised Explosives Devices (PBIEDs) typically consist of bombs worn or carried by a suicide bomber. Suicide bombers wear the PBIED in the form of vests with many pockets sewn into them to hold explosive materials (Figure 25.64). Terrorists may also carry PBIEDs or they may be attached to coerced or unwilling victims. Individuals carrying briefcases or packages are inherently suspicious to security forces, particularly in locations where personnel have to pass through a security checkpoint. In addition to bags, pack-ages, and cases, clothing can conceal a bomb. The contours of bulky suicide vests or belts may be visible prior to detonation (Figure 25.65). Terrorists might also wear unseasonable or atypical attire, such as a coat (which may conceal a suicide belt) during warm weather. Wires or other materials exposed on or around the body could also be an indication of a bomb.

Never approach a suspected or confirmed suicide bomber who is injured or deceased. If there are several strong indicators of a suicide bomber, the first priority is to clear and isolate the area and observe the bomber with binoculars or spotting scopes. Trained personnel from an equipped explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) unit must conduct the first approach. These units may use a bomb disposal robot (Figure 25.66).

Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs)

Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosives Devices (VBIEDs) may contain many thousands of pounds (kilograms) of explosives that can cause massive destruction (Figure 25.67). The explosives can be placed anywhere in a vehicle. When using small vehicles, such as passenger cars, the explosives are often concealed in the trunk.

Response to Explosive/IED Events 

All operations must be conducted within an Incident Command System and determined by the risk/benefit analysis.

In addition, do the following:

• Follow designated SOPs.
• ALWAYS proceed with caution, especially if an explosion has occurred or it is suspected that explosives may be involved in an incident.
• Understand that secondary devices may be involved.
• Request EOD (bomb squad) personnel, hazmat, and other specialized personnel as needed (Figure 25.68).
• Treat the incident scene as a crime scene until proven otherwise.
• NEVER touch or handle a suspected device, even if someone else already has. Only certified, trained bomb technicians should touch, move, defuse, or otherwise handle explosive devices.
• Do not use two-way radios, cell phones, or mobile data terminals (MDT) within a minimum of 300 feet (90 m) of any device or suspected device. The larger the suspicious device, the larger the standoff distance should be.
• Use intrinsically safe communications equipment within the isolation zone.
• Note unusual activities or persons at the scene and report observations to law enforcement.
• Limit personnel exposure until the risk of secondary devices is eliminated.
• Limit exposure until the secondary device risk is eliminated.

Chemical Attacks

A chemical attack is the deliberate release of a toxic gas, liquid, or solid that can poison people and the environment. Attackers may use chemical agents or toxic industrial materials (TIMs). Chemical agents are intended for use in warfare or terrorist activities to kill, seriously injure, or seriously incapacitate people through their physiological effects. TIMs are particularly poisonous hazardous materials that are normally used for industrial purposes, but they could be used by terrorists to deliberately kill, injure, or incapacitate people.

This section explains the following types of chemical agents:

• Nerve agents
• Blister agents (vesicants)
• Blood agents (cyanide agents)
• Choking agents (pulmonary or lung-damaging agents)
• Riot control agents (irritants)
• Toxic industrial materials (common hazardous materials used for terrorist purposes)

Table 25.4 provides the UN/DOT identification number and hazard class for some of the common chemical warfare agents, as well as the ERG where responders can obtain additional information to manage the initial response phases of the incident.

Chemical Attack Indicators

Chemical attacks usually result in readily observable features including signs and symptoms that develop very rapidly.

Chemical attack indicators include:

• Warning or threat of an attack or received intelligence
• Presence of hazardous materials or laboratory equipment that is not relevant to the occupancy
• Intentional release of hazardous materials
• Unexplained patterns of sudden onset of similar, non-traumatic illnesses or deaths (the pattern could be geo-graphic, by employer, or associated with agent dissemination methods)

  ** NOTE: Letters in parentheses next to the name represent military designations, not chemical formulas. **

• Unexplained odours or tastes that are out of character with the surroundings
• Multiple individuals exhibiting unexplained skin, eye, or airway irritation
• Unexplained bomb or munition-like material, especially if it contains a liquid
• Unexplained vapour clouds, mists, and plumes, particularly if they are not consistent with their surroundings
• Multiple individuals exhibiting unexplained health problems such as:
  

  

  • Nausea
  • Vomiting
  • Twitching
  • Tightness in chest
  • Sweating
  • Pinpoint pupils (miosis) (Figure 25.69)
  • Runny nose (rhinorrhea)
  • Disorientation
  • Difficulty breathing
  • Convulsions
• Unexplained deaths and/or mass casualties
• Casualties distributed downwind (outdoors) or near ventilation systems (indoors)
• Multiple individuals experiencing blisters and/or rashes
  

  

• Trees, shrubs, bushes, food crops, and/or lawns that are dead (not just a patch of dead weeds), discoloured, ab-normal in appearance, or withered (not under drought conditions) (Figure 25.70)
• Surfaces exhibiting oily droplets or films and unexplained oily film on water surfaces
• Abnormal number of sick or dead birds, animals, and/or fish
• Unusual security, locks, bars on windows, covered windows, and barbed-wire enclosures

Nerve Agents

Nerve agents are the most toxic chemical warfare agents. Exposure to even minute quantities can kill quickly by attacking the nervous system. Stable, easily dispersed, and highly toxic, nerve agents have rapid effects when absorbed through the skin or respiratory system. Although nerve agents are generally clear and colourless, colours and odours can vary with impurities. Impure “G” agents may have a slight fruity odour. VX is odourless. Although people sometimes use the term nerve gas, the term is a misnomer. Nerve agents are liquids at ambient temperatures and dispersed as an aerosolized liquid (vapour, not gas).

Therefore, the size of the endangered area may be relatively small. However, the vapour hazard can significantly increase if the liquid is exposed to high temperatures, spread over a large area, or aerosolized. Speed is the most important factor in medical management of individuals who have been exposed to nerve agents because of their extremely rapid effects. Effective treatment is best achieved by immediate use of auto-injectors containing antidotes.

Blister Agents

Blister agents (vesicants) burn and blister the skin or any other part of the body they contact. They act on the eyes, mucous membranes, lungs, skin and blood-forming organs. These agents damage the respiratory tract when inhaled and can cause vomiting and diarrhea when ingested. Blister agents are more likely to produce casualties than fatalities, although exposure to such agents can be fatal. Blister agents are usually persistent and may be oily liquids ranging from colourless to pale yellow to dark brown, depending on purity. Blister agents may take several days or weeks to evaporate. It is more difficult to remove these agents during decontamination than less viscous products.

Blood Agents

Blood agents are chemical asphyxiants. They interfere with the body’s ability to use oxygen either by preventing red blood cells from carrying oxygen to other cells in the body or by inhibiting the ability of cells to use oxygen for producing the energy required for metabolism. Some sources may use the terms blood agents and cyanogen agents synonymously, but not all blood agents are cyanogens (for example, arsine is not). Similarly, not all cyanogens are necessarily blood agents. Blood agents are sometimes categorized as TIMs because they also have industrial applications.

First responders should be familiar with the following blood agents:

Arsine (SA)

Arsine gas is formed when arsenic comes in contact with an acid. It is a colourless, nonirritating toxic gas that has a reported mild garlic odour. Most people can only detect this odour at levels higher than those necessary to cause poisoning.

Hydrogen cyanide (AC)

Hydrogen cyanide is a colourless, highly volatile liquid that is extremely flammable, highly soluble, and stable in water. Mixtures of the vapour and air may be explosive. The vapour is less dense than air and has a faint odour that is reported to be similar to bitter almonds; about 25 percent of the population can-not smell hydrogen cyanide.

Cyanogen chloride (CK)

Cyanogen chloride is a colourless, highly volatile liquid that dissolves readily in organic solvents but is only slightly soluble in water. Its vapors are heavier than air. Cyanogen chloride has a pungent, biting odour. Normally, it is a non-persistent hazard. Exposure effects to cyanogen chloride are similar to hydrogen cyanide but with additional irritation to the eyes and mucous membranes.

Choking Agents

Choking agents attack and cause tissue damage to the lungs. They are sometimes called pulmonary or lung-damaging agents. Like blood agents, choking agents have industrial applications, and responders may encounter them during normal hazmat incidents. Choking agents include chemicals such as diphosgene (DP), chloropicin (PS), ammonia, hydrogen chloride, phosphine, and elemental phosphorus.

Two of the most common choking agents are chlorine and phosgene:

1. Chlorine: Yellow-green in colour, chlorine has a pungent, bleach-like, irritating odour. When liquid chlorine is released, it quickly turns into a gas that is heavier than air. Chlorine does not remain in its liquid form for long, so decon is usually not required. Exposure may cause:
   • Coughing
   • Chest tightness
   • Burning eyes, nose, and throat
   • Watering eyes
   • Blurred vision
   • Nausea and vomiting
2. Phosgene: A colourless, nonflammable gas that has the odour of freshly cut hay. Its odour threshold is well above its permissible exposure limit, so it is already at a harmful concentration by the time someone smells it. Phosgene may remain for long periods of time in trenches and other low-lying areas. Phosgene does not remain in its liquid form very long, so decon is usually not required. Exposure symptoms are similar to chlorine, although phosgene may also cause burns and rash to skin.

Riot Control Agents

Riot control agents (sometimes called tear gas or irritating agents) are chemical compounds that cause immediate irritation to the eyes, mouth, throat, lungs, and skin, temporarily disabling people. Several different compounds are considered riot control agents. All riot agents are solids and require dispersion as aerosolized particles, usually released by pyrotechnics (such as with an exploding tear gas canister) or a propelled spray with the particles suspended in a liquid. Some are sold in small containers as personal defence devices containing either a single agent or a mixture. Some devices also contain a dye to visually mark a sprayed assailant. When dispersed, riot control agents are usually heavier than air.

Table 25.5 provides common riot control agent characteristics (CDC, 2013). Because the symptoms of expo-sure are very similar for all the agents, they are listed only once.

In addition to tear gas, mace, pepper spray, and other irritants, the following agents are sometimes categorized as riot control agents:

Incapacitant

Produces a temporary disabling condition that persists for hours to days after exposure has occurred (unlike that produced by most riot control agents).

Examples of incapacitants include:

• Central nervous system (CNS) depressants (anticholinergics): CNS stimulants (lysergic acid diethylamide or LSD)
• Vomiting agent: Causes violent, uncontrollable sneezing, coughing, nausea, vomiting, and a general feeling of bodily discomfort. It is dispersed as an aerosol and produces its effects by inhalation or direct action on the eyes.
• Toxic Industrial Materials (TIMs): A toxic industrial material (TIM) is an industrial chemical that is toxic at a certain concentration and is produced in quantities exceeding 30 tons (30.5 tonnes) per year at one production facility. TIMs are not as lethal as highly toxic nerve agents. However, TIMs pose a far greater threat than chemical warfare agents because they are produced in very large quantities (multiple tons) and are readily available. For example, sulfuric acid is not as lethal as a nerve agent, but it is easier to disseminate large quantities of sulfuric acid because large amounts of it are manufactured and transported every day.

Based on a hazard index ranking (high, medium, or low hazard) that OSHA provides, toxic industrial materials (TIMs) are divided into three hazard categories (Table 25.6 [Stuempfle, et al. 1998]).

The categories are defined as follows:

1. High hazard: Indicates a widely produced, stored, or transported TIM that has high toxicity and is easily vaporized.
2. Medium hazard: Indicates a TIM that may rank high in some categories but is lower in others such as number of producers, physical state, or toxicity.
3. Low hazard: Indicates that this TIM is not likely to be a hazard unless specific operational factors indicate otherwise. Emergency responders should attempt to identify the material involved just as they would at any other hazardous materials incident. Follow all predetermined procedures and the guidelines provided in the ERG and other sources when responding to emergencies involving TIMs.

Operations at Chemical Attack Incidents

The primary operational objective at a chemical attack is to do the greatest good for the greatest number. Responders must be familiar with SOPs/SOGs for handling chemical terrorist attacks and hazardous materials incidents.

Chemical attacks may differ from other hazmat incidents in the following ways:

• Severity of hazards present (such as deadly nerve agents) and need for appropriate PPE to protect against them
• Possibility of secondary devices
• Mass casualties
• Need for rapid decon
• Administration of antidotes

Biological Attacks

The Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) defines biological terrorism as “an intentional release of viruses, bacteria, or their toxins for the purpose of harming or killing citizens.”

Some biological toxins have been manufactured synthetically and/or genetically altered in laboratories (Figure 25.71). They are similar to chemical agents in the way they are disseminated and in their effectiveness as biological weapons.

Biological agents can be transmitted via:

• Aerosolization
• Water
• Food
• Insects

An attack using a biological weapon may not be as immediately obvious as an attack using a bomb or industrial chemical. Generally, biological weapons agents do not cause immediate health effects. Most biological agents take hours, days, or weeks to make someone ill, depending on the agent’s incubation period. Because of this delay, the cause of illness may not be immediately evident, and the source of the attack may be difficult to trace. In the beginning of a biological weapon attack, only a few patients may exhibit symptoms.

The number of infected individuals will increase as the disease continues to transmit from person to person (such as might happen with smallpox). The scope of the problem may not be evident for days or even weeks. However, certain biological toxins (such as saxitoxin, a neurotoxin produced by marine organisms) could potentially act more quickly (in minutes to hours).

Biological Attack Indicators

Biological attacks utilize viruses, bacteria, and/or biological toxins. The effects of biological attacks may not be readily noticeable. Signs and symptoms may take many days to develop.

Biological attack indicators include:

• Warning or threat of an attack or received intelligence
• Presentation of specific unusual diseases such as smallpox
• Unusual number of sick or dying people or animals (often of different species)
• Multiple casualties with similar signs or symptoms
• Dissemination of unscheduled or unusual spray
• Abandoned spray devices (devices may have no distinct odors)
• Non-endemic illness for the geographic area (for example, Venezuelan equine encephalitis in Europe)
• Casualty distribution aligned with wind direction
• Electronic tracking of signs and symptoms (syndromic surveillance) reported to hospitals, pharmacies, and other health care organizations
• Illnesses associated with a common source of food, water, or location
• Large numbers of people exhibiting flu-like symptoms during non-flu months

Depending on the agent used and the scope of an incident, emergency medical services (EMS) responders and health care personnel may be the first to realize that there has been a biological attack. In some cases, there may be reliable evidence, such as a witness to an attack, to implicate terrorist activity, or the discovery of a delivery system, such as finding a contaminated dissemination device, from which an infectious agent is subsequently isolated and identified. If a biological attack is suspected, first responders should immediately notify their local health care agency.

Disease Transmission

Specific methods of infectious disease transmission include (Figure 25.72):

• Airborne transmission (inhalation of airborne organisms or toxins): Diseases remain suspended in air for a long time and when inhaled may penetrate deep into the respiratory tract. Airborne-transmitted diseases, such as influenza, pneumonia, and polio, can typically survive outside the body for long periods of time.
• Contact with infected droplets: Infected droplets, such as rubella, tuberculosis, and SARS, transmit diseases through contact with mucous membranes of the eyes, nose, and mouth. Droplets generally do not stay airborne for long periods of time.
• Direct contact (such as touching or kissing an infected person): Most sexually transmitted diseases, such as HIV, fall into this category; other diseases, such as Ebola, transmitted in this way typically do not survive outside the human body for long.
• Indirect contact (such as touching contaminated surfaces): Indirect contact diseases can generally survive on exposed surfaces for extended periods of time. The Norwalk Virus is an example of a disease transmitted through indirect contact.
• Ingestion of contaminated food or water: Normally this occurs due to contact with infected fecal material. Examples of diseases transmitted through contaminated food or water include amoebic dysentery and cholera.
• Vectors: Some diseases, such as Lyme Disease and the bubonic plague, are spread by insects (fleas, flies, and mosquitoes) and animals (vectors) such as rodents (mice and rats) and livestock.

A disease that is spread by airborne transmission (such as smallpox) has the potential to infect a large number of people more quickly than one that is only transmitted through direct contact (such as HIV or Ebola).

Contagiousness

An infectious disease is one that is caused by a microorganism with the potential to transfer to another person. A contagious disease is one that can spread rapidly from person to person. An attack with a contagious agent, such as smallpox or SARS, has the potential to become an epidemic.

Noncontagious diseases will only affect those individuals who have direct exposure to the disease agent itself. Noncontagious diseases will not spread to other people except by contact with the disease agent. Biological attacks with noncontagious agents, such as anthrax and biological toxins, are not contagious.

Operations at Biological Attack Incidents

Bioterrorism incidents will most likely cross jurisdictional boundaries. Planning efforts must include provisions for sharing resources, critical information, and management responsibilities.

First responders should always adhere to universal precautions whenever they have contact with broken or moist skin, blood, or body fluids. These precautions will protect against many biological agents and/or infected individuals.

Universal precautions include:

• Use disposable gloves (Figure 25.73).
• Change gloves between patients to prevent transmitting the infection from patient to patient.
• Wash hands immediately after removing gloves.
• Use disposable PPE and a face shield if you anticipate any splashing.

Contact the local health department for additional instructions for vaccinations, prophylactic antibiotic therapy, or other appropriate measures for a given disease. In the event of an overt attack or incident, responders should focus on isolation and containment of the biological agent to prevent the spread of pathogens or toxins. Overt attacks could include white powder incidents (with a credible threat), discovery of a suspected biologic laboratory, or witnessed use of spray devices.

The following measures may contain indoor attacks:

• Turning off ventilation systems
• Closing doors and windows
• Turning off elevators
• Sealing ducts, windows, and doors using tape, plastic sheets, and expanding foams to restrict air flow

The following actions may help contain overt, outdoor attacks:

• Cover the device or dispersed agent with tarps or other physical barriers to prevent spreading.
• Decontaminate the dispersed agent with a light spray of water and bleach.
• Secure and place the suspicious item, package, object, or substance in a sealed hazmat recovery bin or container to mitigate spreading.

If possible, keep individuals who have been exposed to biological agents from leaving the scene until a thorough risk assessment has been conducted and appropriate measures taken (potentially in consultation with local health authorities). Whether victims exhibit signs or symptoms of illness, decontamination is recommended for any credible threat involving aerosols or contact with potentially harmful substances.

To ensure containment, use the following guidelines:

• Initially contain persons that may be affected.
• Decontaminate victims if circumstances indicate the need prior to treatment and transport to a medical facility.
• Register (record name and contact information) all persons potentially exposed at the incident in case follow-up is required.

At biological attack incidents, isolation and containment issues will primarily involve managing infected victims; public health authorities will likely manage these issues. Local plans for handling a pandemic flu may translate to other contagious disease outbreaks.

Radiological and Nuclear Attacks

Historically, there have been few attempts at radiological terrorism. Threats have been made, and plans to carry out nuclear attacks have been foiled, but a radiological terrorism attack has not yet occurred. Response to a radiological incident is likely to be similar to the response to other emergency incidents. For example, a response to an attack on a shipment of radioactive materials might follow ERG guidelines for radiological materials, with additional consideration given to secondary devices and evidence preservation.

Responders may not immediately detect the presence or involvement of radiological materials. Emergency response agencies must include radiation monitoring as a normal part of response to any fire and/or explosion incident. The only way to confirm if radiation is present at an incident is to use radiological monitoring equipment. In the event of a nuclear attack, the scale and scope of the disaster facing the local first responders will probably overwhelm them. Responders will undoubtedly require outside assistance to successfully mitigate the incident.

Communication, transportation, water supplies, and resources may be limited or nonexistent. The number of casualties and destruction may be overwhelming. When an organized response is possible, responders should apply the same framework for any emergency response with special consideration given to nuclear/radiological hazards. Because nuclear attacks are extremely unlikely, the following sections will only address radiological devices.

Radiological and Nuclear Attack Indicators

Radiological attacks utilize weapons that release radiological materials, most likely in the form of dust or powder. Dispersal may be accomplished by including the material in a bomb or explosive device, i.e., a radiological dispersal device (RDD).

Radiological attack indicators include:

• Warning or threat of an attack or received intelligence
• Individuals exhibiting signs and symptoms of radiation exposure
• Radiological materials packaging left unattended or abandoned in public locations
• Suspicious packages that seem to weigh more than their appearance suggests they should (such packages may contain lead to shield a radiation source)
• Activation of radiation detection devices, with or without an explosion
• Material that is hot or seems to emit heat without any sign of an external heat source
• Glowing material (strongly radioactive material may emit or cause radio-luminescence)

Nuclear attacks are a little different from radiological attacks; nuclear attacks are the intentional detonation of a nuclear weapon.

Indicators include:

• Warning or threat of an attack or received intelligence
• Mushroom cloud
• Exceptionally large/powerful explosion
• Electromagnetic pulse (EMP)

Radiological Devices

Several types of designs exist for radiological devices. All designs will expose people to radiation or to disperse radiological material. Radiological devices are sometimes referred to as dirty bombs because the contamination they spread could ruin property, crops, and livestock and cause large areas to become unusable. These devices include radiation-exposure devices (REDs), radiological-dispersal devices (RDDs), and radiological-dispersal weapons (RDWs).

Radiation-Exposure Devices

A radiation-exposure device (RED) is a powerful gamma-emitting radiation source. Terrorists may place it in a high-profile location, such as a high-traffic urban area, entertainment arena, or a shopping complex which could expose a large number of people to the intense radiation source (Figure 25.74). Terrorists may also use REDs to target specific individuals and/or harm a limited number of people over a long period of time.

Radiological-Dispersal Devices

The U.S. Department of Defence defines a radiological-dispersal device (RDD) as any device, including weapons or equipment (other than a nuclear explosive device), specifically designed to disseminate radioactive material to cause destruction, damage, or injury by means of the radiation produced by the decay of such material. An RDD is intended to disperse radioactive material over a large area, but an RDD is incapable of producing a nuclear yield. Terrorists use RDDs to create fear and panic by exposing people to radioactive material or to contaminate areas and buildings, making them unusable until decontaminated. An RDD typically uses the force of conventional explosives to scatter radioactive material (Figure 25.75).

Radiological-Dispersal Weapons

Radiological-dispersal weapons (RDWs) or Simple Radiological Dispersal Devices (SRDDs) are nonexplosive RDDs. RDWs can use inexpensive and common items such as pressurized containers, building ventilation systems, fans, and mechanical devices to spread radioactive contamination (Figure 25.76). For example, radioactive material could be placed into a ventilation system and then dispersed throughout a building when the building’s ventilation system is operated. Dispersal by these means would require putting the radioactive material into a dispersible form (powder or liquid) and would require large amounts of radioactive material to pose a hazard once dispersed.

Operations at Radiological Attack Incidents

The Incident Command System (ICS) and local/jurisdictional procedures will establish priorities at radiological incidents. For most terrorism events, individual fire departments will eventually fold into a larger ICS structure. After multiple agencies with overlapping authority arrive, a Unified Command Structure will establish incident control. Until those agencies arrive, the AHJ’s Incident Management System will provide the necessary structure for managing the incident at the lowest level.

At the scene, hazard identification and characterization are important. Responders should always evaluate the area for new hazards, weather changes, or changing conditions. If responders suspect terrorism, they should proceed cautiously, evaluate the scene for radiation levels, and note potential locations of secondary devices. They should designate and enforce scene control zones.

The following geographic and environmental factors can complicate a radiological terrorism incident:

• Prevailing winds that can carry airborne radioactive particulates
• Broken water mains
• Vehicle and/or pedestrian traffic flow
• Ventilation systems
• Air and rail corridors
• Natural or man-made influences

Lesson 7

Other Criminal Activities and Natural Disasters

In addition to terrorism, other, criminal activities and the damage from natural disasters are unique hazardous materials incidents.

The most common are as follows:

1. Illicit labs
2. Illegal hazmat dumps
3. Hazmat release due to natural disasters

Illicit Labs

Illicit laboratories may be used to manufacture drugs, explosives, biological weapons such as ricin, or chemical warfare agents. Drug labs, in particular, can be found virtually anywhere, from hotel rooms and private residences to portable labs in vehicles and campgrounds (Figure 25.77).

These labs can be extremely hazardous and, if you discover one, you should: Stop, Get out, and Report it to authorities immediately!

Table 25.7 provides key indicators of different illicit lab types. While there may be some similarities between lab types, the clues may add up overall to indicate one type of lab.

Illegal Hazmat Dumps

Illegal chemical dumps may occur in any jurisdiction. Some illegal disposers may consider lawful disposal too expensive or complicated. In other cases, the disposers may have used the materials in illicit labs or other illegal activities. Some chemical dumpsites may have existed years before any regulations prohibited such actions. Depending on the chemicals involved and the location of the site, discovery of an illegal dump may be con-sidered an emergency. However, first responders may be the first person called to the scene. Legal dumpsites may be expensive to clean up, and cleanup often requires state/provincial and/or federal/national involvement.

Hazmat During and After Disasters

Natural disasters, such as floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, and earthquakes, can create hazmat incidents. For example, flood waters may move containers of all shapes, sizes, and contents (Figure 25.78). Floods can float tanks off foundations and sweep away entire chemical storage yards. Some containers may release their contents into the flood waters, and dead animals may also be present. Tornadoes and earthquakes may damage containers, rip up piping, or move containers around. Large-scale events, such as hurricanes, can cause problems with massive quantities of abandoned household hazardous waste (such as refrigerators with Freon cannot be taken to the local landfill) (Figure 25.79). Industries may be affected and experience chemical or oil spills.

After the disaster, many hazardous materials containers may not be correctly placarded or labeled, resulting in identification difficulties. Problems created by natural disasters may overwhelm local response capabilities. On-scene conditions may also

limit defensive and offensive actions. Know who and how to call for assistance, and keep in mind the need to follow all hazardous waste rules for disposal of orphaned hazardous materials. In many cases, federal help will be needed and available. Include consideration of potential disasters in your pre-incident surveys and preplanning.

Lesson 8

Evaluating Progress

The final aspect of the APIE process is looking back or evaluating progress.

This evaluation is conducted through-out the incident and continues until termination. Skill Sheet 25-5 provides basic steps for evaluating and reporting progress at a hazardous materials incident.

The following sections address:

• Progress reports
• Recovery
• When to withdraw
• Termination

Progress Reports

If an IAP is effective, the IC should receive favourable progress reports from tactical and/or task supervisors, and the incident should begin to stabilize. As new information becomes available and circumstances change, the IC should also reevaluate the plan. If the initial plan is not working, it must be changed either by selecting new strategies or by changing the tactics used to achieve them. In accordance with predetermined communication procedures, first responders should communicate the status of the planned response and the progress of their actions to the IC. Responders must be trained to use the communication equipment they are issued and be familiar with the AHJ’s communication procedures.

When to Withdraw The IAP must be reevaluated and possibly revised should mitigation efforts fail or the situation worsen (or intensify). If the threat of BLEVE or other dangerous situation develops, it may become necessary to withdraw immediately. Some indicators to withdraw include (Figure 25.80):

• Sudden change in temperature
• Sudden change in pressure
• Audible indicators of a pressure relief device activating
• Sudden increase in flames

Recovery

Normally, the last strategic goals at a hazardous materials emergency are recovery and termination efforts. Recovery deals with returning the incident scene and responders to a pre-incident level of readiness. Termination involves documenting the incident and using this information to evaluate the response.

The major goals of the recovery phase are as follows:

• Return the operational area to a safe condition.
• Debrief personnel before they leave the scene.
• Return the equipment and personnel of all involved agencies to the condition they were in before the incident.

On-Scene Recovery

On-scene recovery efforts aim to return the scene to a safe condition. These activities may require the coordinated effort of numerous agencies, technical experts, and contractors. Generally, fire and emergency services organizations do not conduct remedial cleanup actions unless those actions are absolutely necessary to eliminate conditions that present an imminent threat to public health and safety. If such imminent threats do not exist, contracted remediation firms under the oversight of local, state/provincial and federal environmental regulators generally provide for these cleanup activities. In these situations, the fire and emergency services organization may also provide control and safety oversight according to local SOPs.

On-Scene Debriefing

On-scene debriefing, conducted in the form of a group discussion, gathers information from all operating personnel, including law enforcement, public works, and EMS responders.

During the debriefing stage, responders should obtain the following information:

• Important observations
• Actions taken
• Timeline of those actions

During the hazardous communication briefing (required by OSHA in the U.S.), provide personnel with information concerning the signs and symptoms of overexposure to the hazardous materials involved in the incident. It is important that this debriefing process be thoroughly documented. Each person attending must receive and understand the instructions and sign a document certifying that the information was both received and understood.

Provide the following information to responders before they leave the scene:

• Identity of material involved
• Potential adverse effects of exposure to the material
• Actions to be taken for further decontamination
• Signs and symptoms of an exposure
• Mechanism by which a responder can obtain medical evaluation and treatment
• Exposure documentation procedures Operational Recovery Operational recovery involves actions necessary to return resource forces to pre-incident readiness.

These actions involve:

• Release of units
• Resupply of materials and equipment
• Decontamination of equipment and PPE
• Preliminary actions necessary for obtaining financial restitution

The financial effect of hazardous materials emergencies can greatly exceed that of any other activity conducted by the fire and emergency services. Normally, a fire and emergency services organization’s revenues obtained from taxes or subscriber fees are calculated based upon the equipment and personnel necessary to conduct fire suppres-sion and other emergency activities. Communities should have in place the necessary ordinances to allow for the recovery of costs incurred from such emergencies.

A vital part of this process is to document costs through the Unit Log and other tracking mechanisms. Termination In order to conclude an incident, the IC must ensure that all strategic goals have been accomplished and the re-quirements of laws have been met. Documentation, analysis, and evaluation must be completed. The termination phase involves two procedural actions: postincident critiques and post-incident analysis (PIA).

Post-incident Critique

OSHA Title 29 CFR 1910.120 mandates that incidents are critiqued for the purposes of identifying operational deficiencies and learning from mistakes. As with all critiques performed by fire and emergency services, hazardous materials incident critiques need to occur as soon as possible after the incident and involve all responders, including law enforcement, public works, and EMS responders. As with other administrative and emergency-response functions, documentation of the critique lists those individuals in attendance as well as any operational deficiencies that were identified.

Post-incident Analysis

The post-incident analysis process compiles the information obtained from the debriefings, post-incident reports, and critiques to identify trends regarding operational strengths and weaknesses. Once trends have been identified, recommendations for improvements are made.

Recommendations during this analysis may include several categories:

• Operational weaknesses
• Training needs
• Necessary procedural changes
• Required additional resources
• Necessary updates and/or required changes

The post-incident analysis also includes:

• Completion of necessary reporting procedures required to document personal exposures
• Equipment exposures
• Incident reports
• Staff analysis reports
• Change or improvement benchmarked for further consideration
• Follow-up analysis or training

Post-incident analysis forms the basis for improved response. Therefore, schedule follow-up analysis or training to ensure successful implementation.

Chapter Review